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UNSAFE IN AMERICA: A REVIEW OF THE U.S.-
CANADA SAFE THIRD COUNTRY AGREEMENT
Andrew F. Moore*
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 23, 2004, over four hundred men, women
and children from many parts of the world crossed the
Canadian border at Fort Erie, coming from Buffalo, New
York.1 They waited in sub-zero temperatures on school buses
and in a make-shift camp, separated from their luggage and
basic necessities.2 All asserted that they were refugees and
sought protection in Canada before they lost the opportunity
to do so. 3 Their opportunity to obtain refugee status lapsed
on December 29, 2004, when the Safe Third Country
Agreement (STCA) between the United States and Canada
became effective.4 Pursuant to this agreement, Canada began
turning back those coming through the United States
claiming to be refugees. Since the STCA entered into force,
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. The
author extends his deep gratitude to Professors Brett Boyce, James Hathaway,
Kevin Johnson, Stephen Legomsky, and Browne Lewis for reading earlier drafts
of this work. The author also thanks the Canadian-American Research Centre
for Law and Policy (CARC), and the participants of the Canadian-U.S. Border
Legal Issues Post 9/11 Conference, hosted by CARC, and the University of
Windsor Law School.
1. CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES, CLOSING THE FRONT DOOR ON
REFUGEES: REPORT ON THE FIRST YEAR OF THE SAFE THIRD COUNTRY
AGREEMENT 27 (2005) [hereinafter CLOSING THE FRONT DOOR], available at
http:/www.web.ca/-ccr/closingdoordec05.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 26.
4. Id. at 1.
5. Id. at 26.
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the number of refugee applicants at the Canadian border has
fallen precipitously.6 Refugee agencies and shelters that
previously facilitated transit are now telling refugee
applicants that the Canadian border is closed to them.7
The STCA is part of a comprehensive border security
agreement between the United States and Canada initiated
in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.8
According to press releases following its enactment, the STCA
"allocates responsibility between the United States and
Canada whereby one or the other country (but not both) will
assume responsibility for processing the claims of certain
asylum seekers . . . ."9 According to the release, the STCA
"enhances the two nations' ability to manage, in an orderly
fashion, asylum claims brought by persons crossing our
common border."' However, many refugee advocates believe
that the STCA's true purpose is to reduce the number of
refugee claims made in Canada."
The assumption behind the STCA is that both the United
States and Canada provide protection to refugees in a fashion
consistent with international law.'2 Therefore, conventional
wisdom holds that genuine refugees should apply for
6. Id. at 3-4.
7. CLOSING THE FRONT DOOR, supra note 1, at 10.
8. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., U.S.-Canada Smart
Border/30 Point Action Plan Update (Dec. 6, 2002),
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press-release_0057.shtm (last visited Mar.
1, 2007). An agreement of this sort had been proposed previously in 1993 but
never finalized. See Arthur C. Helton, Toward Harmonized Asylum Procedures
in North America: The Proposed United States-Canada Memorandum of
Understanding for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims
from Nationals of Third Countries, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 737 (1993). An accord
in 1995 permitted the return of refugee claimants, but neither country relied
upon the privilege. Howard Adelman, Canadian Borders and Immigration
Post-9/11, 36 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 15 (2002).
9. Audrey Macklin, Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on the Canada-U.S.
Safe Third Country Agreement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 365, 369-71
(2005); Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep't
Homeland Sec., United States and Canada Implement Safe Third Country
Agreement on Asylum (Dec. 29, 2004), available at
http://canada.usembassy.gov/content/can-usa/asylum_122904.pdf.
10. Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., supra note 9.
11. Macklin, supra note 9, at 369-71.
12. Agreement for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status
Claims from Nationals of Third Countries [Safe Third Country Agreement],
U.S.-Can., preamble, Dec. 6, 2002, State Dep't. No. 05-35, (implemented at 8
C.F.R. pts. 208, 212, 235) (entered into force Dec. 29, 2004), available at
http'//www.cic.gc.ca/english/policy/safe%2Dthird.html.
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protection in whichever country they arrive in first, because
both are safe countries, and genuine refugees should be
satisfied with the first safe place they find. 3 However, there
are good reasons to challenge the assumption that the United
States is a safe country for all refugees. There are also good
reasons to conclude that Canada will violate its international
legal obligations if it returns a refugee applicant to the
United States to face a system that does not comport with
international refugee protection or human rights obligations.
This article will assess the STCA by evaluating the
United States' refugee processing system. It concludes that
there are several features of the U.S. system that clearly
violate international laws regarding the protection of
refugees 4 as well as other human rights norms.15 Arguable
violations of refugee law16 and human rights norms will also
be discussed. 7 These violations raise the possibility of
refugee applicants challenging the legality of Canada's
participation in the STCA in both domestic and international
fora. 8
This article begins in Part II with an explanation of how
safe third country agreements work and an historical review
of such agreements. 9 A closer examination of the particular
provisions of the United States-Canada agreement will follow
in Part 111.20 Part IV describes the framework of
international laws protecting refugees and briefly looks at the
refugee protection systems operating in the United States
and Canada.2' Part V will review how safe third country
agreements may compromise international legal protections.22
It will also introduce the principle that nations may be held
in violation of international law if they return a refugee
applicant to a country that fails to provide minimum
protections to refugees.
13. Macklin, supra note 9, at 381-82.
14. See infra Part VI.A.1.
15. See infra Part VI.B.1.
16. See infra Part VI.A.2.
17. See infra Part VI.B.2.
18. See infra Part VII.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part V.
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Part VI will apply these principles to the STCA.24 This
article will assess which aspects of the United States' refugee
processing system fail to provide minimum legal protections,
and therefore prohibit Canada from returning a refugee
applicant to the United States. Part VII will look at the
various fora which may be used to challenge Canada's
participation in the STCA.25 Finally, this article will propose
that calibrating the refugee protection systems of Canada and
the United States may be a better way to address the issues
that led to the enactment of the STCA.26
Before proceeding, a word about terminology. The term
"refugee" as used by Canada and the United States refers to a
person who fits a definition established in the international
treaty concerning refugees, the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention).27  However,
Canada and the United States use different nomenclature for
the same legal protection given to one who meets the
definition of refugee. The United States uses the term
"asylum" to denote the legal status of protection granted to a
person who meets the international definition of a refugee,
whereas Canada uses the term "refugee status."
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SAFE THIRD COUNTRY AGREEMENTS
A. Definition
The STCA's title is derived from a concept that recently
emerged in international refugee law. The concept evolved to
address the following situation: a person fleeing from danger
leaves the country of persecution (the first country) and
ultimately arrives in a country in which she or he wants to
receive protection (the second country).28  However, the
quickest route between the first country and the second
24. See infra Part VI.
25. See infra Part VII.
26. See infra Part VIII.
27. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee
Convention].
28. Stephen Legomsky, Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of
Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection, 15
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 567, 567 (2003).
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country is not a straight line. 29 The path of flight leads the
person through one or more countries before arriving in the
second country.3° These countries through which the person
fled are referred to as third countries.31 Safe third country
agreements are concerned with the movement between the
third country and the second country.32
Essentially, a safe third country agreement provides that
once a person fleeing persecution crosses through the
territory of a country party to the agreement, that country is
responsible for assessing refugee status.3 3 If an individual
attempts to enter another country party to the agreement
(the second country), he or she may be summarily returned to
the third country.34 The second country does not make any
determination as to whether the person fleeing deserves
refugee protection because the safe third country agreement
assigns responsibility to the third country to assess refugee
status .
B. History of Safe Third Country Agreements
The United States and Canada are certainly not unique
in creating a safe third country agreement. Similar
agreements exist among many countries trying to control the
movement of people from third countries to second countries.
Such agreements were originally developed between countries
belonging to the European Union (E.U.). 36
Between 1985 and 2000, Western European countries
were inundated with a wave of over five and a half million
people requesting protection from persecution." In order to
29. Id. at 568.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 575.
33. See id.; see also JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 (2005).
34. See Legomsky, supra note 28, at 575.
35. See id. at 575.
36. Gretchen Borchelt, Note, The Safe Third Country Practice in the
European Union: A Misguided Approach to Asylum Law and a Violation of
International Human Rights Standards, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 473, 475
(2003).
37. See id. at 490-99; see also Maryellen Fullerton, Failing the Test:
Germany Leads Europe in Dismantling Refugee Protection, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J.
231,232 n.4 (2001). This migration was caused by instability and poor economic
conditions in many countries in Eastern Europe as well as Africa, Asia, Central
2007] 205
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deal with this influx, as well as to harmonize their
immigration policies, several E.U. countries entered into the
Schengen Convention in 1990.38 The Schengen Convention
contained provisions on processing asylum claims that limited
applicants seeking protection to doing so in a single Schengen
country.39 Several objective criteria would guide decisions on
which Schengen country had responsibility for determining
refugee status.40  The Schengen Convention also provided
that a party to the Convention could return an asylum seeker
to a third country on the basis of these criteria.41
Following the Schengen Convention, the Dublin
Convention further institutionalized safe third country
agreements.42 The Dublin Convention established that an
application for protection should be made in the first E.U.
country in which an asylum seeker arrives.4 3 Additionally, it
authorized the return of an asylum seeker to a non-E.U. state
if that state was considered to be safe.' Like the Schengen
Convention, the Dublin Convention permitted the rejection of
an asylum seeker's application on the basis that the
application should have been made in a third country.45 In
2003, the safe third country provisions of the Dublin
Convention were codified in an E.U. regulation, making them
part of E.U. law.46
Concurrently, within individual E.U. countries, changes
America and the Middle East. See Borchelt, supra note 36, at 490-91.
38. See Borchelt, supra note 36, at 493-94. The treaty was named after the
town in Luxembourg where the treaty was signed. The parties to the Schengen
Convention were Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Federal Republic
of Germany, and the French Republic. See id. at 494 n.97.
39. Id. at 495.
40. Id. The objective criteria included whether a state had issued a visa or
other travel document to the refugee applicant, whether the refugee applicant
had proper documents, whether the refugee applicant had already begun
proceedings to determine refugee status in another Schengen country, and
whether there was a final determination of refugee status in another Schengen
country. Id. at 495-96 (citing Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of
14 June 1985, on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders,
art. 30, June 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 84).
41. Borchelt, supra note 36, at 496.
42. See id. at 496-97; see also Legomsky, supra note 28, at 578.
43. See Borchelt, supra note 36, at 496.
44. See id. at 497.
45. See id.
46. See Panayiotis N. Papadimitiriou & loannis F. Papageorgiou, The New
"Dubliners'. Implementation of European Council Regulation 343/2003 (Dublin-
II) by the Greek Authorities, 18 J. REFUGEE STUD. 299, 302-03 (2005).
206 [Vol: 47
UNSAFE IN AMERICA
in domestic refugee and asylum law occurred due to
disproportionate burdens in dealing with the flood of asylum
seekers.47 For example, Germany was compelled to change its
domestic law in 1993 in response to the fact that it handled
upwards of fifty percent of all refugee applicants in Western
Europe between 1983 and 1993.48 Prior to 1993, Germany
codified its commitment to refugees in its constitution,
stating: "Persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy
the right of asylum."4 9 However, this protection was sharply
curtailed in 1993 with the addition of several provisions,
including a safe third country provision. 0 It essentially
became impossible to file an asylum claim if one traveled
through another country to get to Germany. As a result, the
number of asylum applications in Germany decreased by fifty
percent in 1994 and has continued on a downward trend ever
since.5'
These developments were accompanied by the evolution
of bilateral readmission agreements between E.U. countries
and Central and Eastern European countries.52 Under these
agreements, Central and Eastern European countries agreed
to take back persons who traveled through those countries to
apply for asylum in a Western European state.53 These
agreements allowed the E.U. countries to refuse to consider
asylum applications on the grounds that asylum seekers
could seek protection in the Central and Eastern European
countries through which they passed.54 As a result, asylum
seekers now face the prospect of retracing their path of flight
and being sent back by a series of countries, each claiming
that another is a safe third country. This practice raises
criticisms of safe third country agreements that will be
47. See Borchelt, supra note 36, at 474.
48. See Fullerton, supra note 37, at 232.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 233-34, 243-45. In addition to the E.U. countries, which are
presumptively safe countries, Germany identified any non-E.U. country with
which it shared a border as a safe country, thereby establishing what has been
called a cordon sanitaire around Germany. See id. at 243-44.
51. BELA Hovy, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2001: REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS
AND OTHER PERSONS OF CONCERN-TRENDS IN DISPLACEMENT, PROTECTION
AND SOLUTIONS 80, 112-13 annexes C1 & C2 (UNHCR 2002) [hereinafter
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2001].
52. Legomsky, supra note 28, at 576-77.
53. See Fullerton, supra note 37, at 250.
54. See Legomsky, supra note 28, at 575.
20071 207
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
discussed below. 55
III. THE STCA BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
Similar pressures to those in Europe brought about the
STCA between Canada and the United States. The number
of asylum claims in the United States and Canada between
1985 and 2000 totaled over 1.6 million.56  The
disproportionate number of people seeking asylum in Canada
also led to the agreement." In terms of absolute numbers of
asylum claims, the United States receives far more claims
than Canada.5 8  However, when it comes to movement
between the two countries, with the United States or Canada
serving as the third country, the statistics are clear and
revealing. Since at least 1990, the flow of persons leaving the
United States to seek refugee status in Canada is almost
forty-four times the number of persons leaving Canada to
seek asylum in the United States.5 9
There may be many reasons for people to choose Canada
over the United States as the country in which to seek
refugee protection, but two aspects of Canada's refugee
determination system are particularly noteworthy in this
respect. First, there is a general perception that asylum
applicants are more likely to receive protection in Canada."
Statistics suggest that Canada has a higher approval rate of
asylum applications than the United States. 1 In addition,
55. See infra Part V.
56. See STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2001, supra note 51, at 112-13 annexes C.1-
.2.
57. See CLOSING THE FRONT DOOR, supra note 1, at 2.
58. See STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2001, supra note 51, at 112-13 annexes C.1-
.2. In 1985, Canada had 13,00 new asylum applications, and the United States
had 16,622; in 1990, Canada had 36,735 new asylum applications, and the
United States had 73,637; in 1995, Canada had 26,072 new asylum
applications, and the United States had 149,065; in 2000, Canada had 34,252
new asylum applications, and the United States had 40,867. Id.
59. See CLOSING THE FRONT DOOR, supra note 1, at 2 n.4. According to the
Canadian Council of Refugees, from 1990-2004, on the U.S.-Canadian border,
8750 claimants per year applied in Canada as compared to only 200 cases per
year in the United States. Id.
60. See Refugees Flock to Canadian Border to Beat Changes in Immigration
Laws, GUELPH MERCURY (Can.), Dec. 29, 2004, at A6.
61. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), in 2002, the acceptance rate for refugee claims in Canada
was 57.8%, compared to an acceptance rate of 34.9% in the United States. See
Mary-Anne Kate, The Provision of Protection to Asylum-Seekers in Destination
208 [Vol: 47
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Canada applies a separate "humanitarian and
compassionate" consideration which provides an alternate
means of attaining permanent residency in Canada if the
refugee claim fails.62
Furthermore, the system in the United States contains
hurdles which make it more difficult to apply for asylum.
Most significant is the requirement that an asylum seeker
apply for asylum within one year of his or her arrival in the
United States.63 No such requirement exists in the Canadian
system.6 There are also several bars and restrictions on
receiving protection in the United States not found in the
Canadian system, such as a higher burden of proof, and
broader grounds of exclusion from protection on the basis of
criminal conduct or alleged support to terrorist
organizations.65
Secondly, Canada has a far more generous support
system for those going through the process of applying for
protection. When a person enters Canada to apply for
asylum, he or she has access to critical support mechanisms,
including social assistance to cover living expenses and
comprehensive medical care, free legal representation, as well
as permission to seek employment.66 The United States does
Countries 1 (UNHCR, Evaluation & Policy Analysis Unit, Paper No. 114, 2005),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/research/opendoc.pdftbl=RESEARCH&id=42846e7f2 (providing a
table of refugee recognition rates). It should be noted that both of these rates
are significantly higher than the average-thirteen percent-for all countries
studied in the working paper. Id. As this article will discuss, however, these
statistics are open to various challenges.
62. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, § 25 (Can.).
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2003). There are several narrow exceptions to
this rule. See, e.g., id. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
64. Canadian Council for Refugees, 10 Reasons Why Safe Third Country Is
a Bad Deal, Feb. 2005, at http'J/www.web.net/-ccr/10reasons.html.
65. See infra Part VI.
66. See Citizenship and Immigration Can., Rights to Employment,
Education and Health Services, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/asylum-
5.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2007); see also Tom Clark, Legal Aid, International
Human Rights & Non-Citizens, 16 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 218, 222-23
(1998). The Canadian system has not been free from critique, as revealed by
Mr. Clark's paper. See id. The access to legal representation varies
considerably by Province. Id. at 222. For a critique of the provision of housing,
see Robert A. Murdie, Pathways to Housing: The Experiences of Sponsored
Refugees and Refugee Claimants in Accessing Permanent Housing in Toronto
(May 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http./ceris.metropolis.net/Virtual%20Library/RFPReports/Murdie1999.pdf.
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not provide similar support, and further, changed its laws to
limit the number of asylum seekers who receive permission to
work.67
The disproportionate flow of applicants from the United
States to Canada led Canadian officials to seek an agreement
with the United States similar to the European model. 8
Thus, the STCA designates Canada and the United States as
safe third countries vis-A-vis one another. 69 Under the STCA,
a claim for protection must be made in the first country in
which a refugee claimant lands. 7' Further, the third country
must determine whether an applicant fits the definition of a
refugee, and must prohibit the removal of that person to
another country until a refugee status determination has
been made.7'
The STCA has several important limitations. The first is
its scope of application. The STCA only applies at land
border ports of entry on the United States/Canada border.72
It does not apply to airports, seaports, or those claims made
"inland"; that is, in the interior of Canada rather than at a
designated border crossing. Thus, if a refugee applicant
arrives in Canada from the United States by sea or air, or
enters at a point other than a designated land border
crossing, that applicant can apply for asylum in Canada and
will not be retuned to the United States.74
Numerous exceptions to the STCA also limit the
agreement. There are several exceptions based on family
relationships. Those applicants with family members 75 who
67. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2); see also John Fredriksson, Bridging the Gap
Between Rights and Responsibilities: Policy Changes Affecting Refugees and
Immigrants in the United States Since 1996, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 757, 773-75
(2000).
68. See CLOSING THE FRONT DOOR, supra note 1, at 1-2; Macklin, supra note
9, at 370-71.
69. Safe Third Country Agreement, supra note 12, at art. 1.1(A).
70. Id. at art. 4.
71. Id. at art. 3.1.
72. Id. at art. 1.1.
73. CLOSING THE FRONT DOOR, supra note 1, at 1 (indicating that the STCA
applies to refugees making a claim at the "US-Canada land border"); see also
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CAN., supra note 80, at 82.
74. Id. (stating that those refugees who apply at a land border will be
rejected by Canada and summarily sent back to the United States).
75. The term "family member" is defined in a limited fashion, however. See,
e.g., Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001 § 121, ch. 27 (Can.);
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 § 1(3) (Can.),
[Vol: 47210
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are citizens of, or who have been granted refugee status or
other lawful status by either the United States or Canada are
not be subject to the STCA.76 Additionally, if the family
member in question is eighteen or above, has filed an
application for refugee protection, and is eligible to pursue a
refugee claim, the STCA will not apply.77
There are also exceptions based on nationality. The
STCA excludes United States and Canadian nationals and
those who are stateless but who habitually reside in either
the United States or Canada." Persons from certain
designated countries who enter and make refugee claims are
also excluded from coverage under the STCA.79  The
Canadian government periodically designates countries to
which Canada will not return applicants, and as a result,
nationals of these designated countries are not subject to the
STCA.80 Finally, nationals of countries from which neither
the United States nor Canada require a visa to enter and
persons with valid travel visas are exempt from the STCA. 1
A third group of exceptions is based on public interest
grounds. The STCA contains a specific article allowing the
United States and Canada, in their own discretion, to
consider a refugee application when it is in the public interest
to do so.8 2 Additionally, unaccompanied minors without
parents in either Canada or the United States are excluded
available at http'//laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cr/SOR-2002-227///en. The
relationship between the relatives must be a closer familial relationship than
cousins: siblings, children, parents, grandchildren, grandparents, nieces,
nephews, aunts and uncles are all eligible family relationships for the exception.
See id. § 159.1; see also Immigration and Refugee Protection Act: Regulations
Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, P.C. 2004-1157,
138 CAN. GAZETTE 1618, 1619 (2004) [hereinafter Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act], available at
http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partII/2004/20041103/pdf/g2-13822.pdf.
76. Safe Third Country Agreement, supra note 12, at art. 4.2(a).
77. Id. at art. 4.2(b).
78. Id. at art. 2.
79. Id.
80. See CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CAN., PP1: PROCESSING CLAIMS FOR
REFUGEE PROTECTION IN CANADA 79-80 (2006), available at
http://www.cic.gc.ca/manuals-guides/english/pp/ppOle.pdf. Currently, the list
includes citizens of Zimbabwe, Burundi, Afghanistan, Iraq, Rwanda, Haiti, and
Liberia. See Citizenship and Immigration Can., Designated Country/Territory
List, httpJ/www.cic.gc.ca/english/visitdcl.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
81. Safe Third Country Agreement, supra note 12, at arts. 4.2(d)(i)-(ii).
82. Id. at art. 6.
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from the STCA.s3
Despite these exclusions, the STCA has significantly
impacted the flow of refugees between the United States and
Canada. Between January and November of 2005, nearly
three hundred refugee applicants were returned to the United
States. 4 The impact of the STCA is also evidenced by the
decline of refugee applications in Canada. According to
nongovernmental organizations monitoring the
implementation of the STCA, the total number of refugee
claims fell dramatically in Canada in 2005,5 resulting in the
lowest number of refugee claims since Canada's current
refugee determination system took effect in 1989.86 The
number of claims made at the border was fifty percent lower
in 2005 as compared to 2004.7 Thus, the STCA is having a
genuine effect on a considerable number of refugee
applicants.8 8
Canada's choice to participate in the STCA raises several
important questions. What international laws are binding on
Canada and the United States with regard to protecting
refugees? Given that most of the refugee applicants affected
by the STCA are being returned from Canada to the United
States, does the United States' refugee processing system
comport with international standards? What is Canada's
accountability if the U.S. system deviates from these
international obligations? These questions are addressed
below.
83. Id. at art. 4.2(c). There are several other specific limitations in the
regulations of Canada that will be addressed below. See, e.g., infra notes 123,
222-25 and accompanying text.
84. HARVARD LAW STUDENT ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BORDERING
ON FAILURE: THE U.S.-CANADA SAFE THIRD COUNTRY AGREEMENT FIFTEEN
MONTHS AFTER IMPLEMENTATION 8 (Harvard Law Sch. 2006) [hereinafter
BORDERING ON FAILURE], available at
httpJ/www.law.harvard.edu/academics/clinical/asylum-law/HarvardSTCARe
port.pdf.
85. CLOSING THE FRONT DOOR, supra note 1, at 3-4.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. This decline occurred disproportionately among certain nationalities,
most notably Colombians. See CLOSING THE FRONT DOOR, supra note 1, at ii.
The reason for this disproportionate impact is not entirely clear. But,
contributing factors include the large number of Colombian refugee applicants
arriving in Canada prior to the implementation of the STCA and the fact that
many Colombians do not qualify for a family exemption from the STCA. Id. at
8.
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IV. THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC
PROTECTION REGIMES
A. International Protections: Non-Refoulement and Basic
Human Rights
This area of law has been addressed previously in
textbooks and treatises, 9 so this will be a brief review of the
sources of rights refugees enjoy and the mechanisms to
implement those protections. The modern foundational
international treaty for refugee law is the 1951 Refugee
Convention,90 which was drafted under the auspices of the
United Nations and modified by the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees. 91 The Refugee Convention defines
who a refugee is and provides certain protections for that
person.92 It defines a "refugee" as one who "owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and
is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country."93 Thus, an individual must
demonstrate that he or she is being persecuted by a
government or by someone that the government is unable or
unwilling to control, and that the persecution is on account of
at least one of the five stated grounds: his or her race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group
or political opinion. 94
89. See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1996); HATHAWAY, supra note 33; KAREN MUSALO, JENNIFER MOORE &
RICHARD A. BOSWELL, REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACH (3d ed. 2007).
90. Refugee Convention, supra note 27.
91. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Refugee
Protocol]. The creators of the 1951 Refugee Convention were responding to the
conditions of post-war Europe and limited the protections provided under the
Convention to people in Europe who were forced to flee their own countries
prior to January 1, 1951. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee
Convention, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229, 232 (1996). The 1967 Protocol recognized
that the problem of refugees was a global problem and eliminated the date and
time restrictions. Id.
92. Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 1.
93. Id. at art. 1A.
94. See id.
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The central protection of the Refugee Convention is
called non-refoulement, a word developed from the French
verb refouler, which means "to push back."95 The non-
refoulement provision, found in Article 33, states: "No
contracting state shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion."96 In addition to the Refugee Convention,
protection for refugees and the provision of non-refoulement is
also found in other international treaties protecting basic
human rights.97 However, it is unclear whether the principle
of non-refoulement has evolved into a universal norm that is
binding upon all nations.98
There is a plethora of other rights contained in the
Refugee Convention. The Refugee Convention forbids
member nations from penalizing refugee applicants for illegal
entry or presence. 99 It also prohibits discrimination against
refugees,'00 provides for the equal treatment of nationals with
respect to the exercise of religious beliefs, 1 1 access to
elementary education 10 2 and to the courts within member
nations,0 3 as well as identity papers.0 4 Beyond these basic
protections, the Refugee Convention calibrates the rights a
refugee enjoys to the lawful status that refugee has in a
country. 10 5
95. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 91, at 235; Word-Reference.com,
Dictionnaire Francais-Anglais, http://www.wordreference.com/fren/refouler (last
visited Mar. 9, 2007) (providing definition of the French verb "refouler").
96. Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 33.
97. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter CAT]; American Convention on Human Rights, Pact of San Jose,
Costa Rica, art. 22, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter American Convention], available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-32.html.
98. HATHAWAY, supra note 33, at 363-64.
99. Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 31; see also HATHAWAY,
supra note 33, at 370-88.
100. See Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 3.
101. Id. at art. 4.
102. Id. at art. 22.
103. Id. at art. 16.
104. Id. at art. 27.
105. See James C. Hathaway & Anne K. Cusick, Refugee Rights Are Not
Negotiable, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 481,493 (2000).
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In order to monitor the application of the Refugee
Convention and encourage the adoption of further treaties,1" 6
the United Nations established a body called the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).'1 7
Under the terms of the Refugee Convention, all member
nations must cooperate with the UHNCR in order to
"facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the
provisions of the Convention. " 10 8  The UNHCR drafted a
handbook on procedures and criteria for determining refugee
status and issued guidelines to update or supplement the
procedures and substantive law on the protection of
refugees. 10 9 These guidelines and procedures further identify
the responsibilities of the parties under the Refugee
Convention.
These refugee rights are part of a larger web of human
rights protections. Foundational in this system is the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which the
United Nations adopted in 1948.110 The UDHR was not a
binding treaty, but instead represented the common belief of
the nations of the world that human beings enjoyed rights,
privileges and freedoms based upon their inherent human
dignity."' After the UDHR was adopted, many human rights
treaties were drafted and enacted under the auspices of the
United Nations." 2 Of particular importance for the purposes
of this article are the International Covenant on Civil and
106. Statute of the UNHCR, G.A. Res. 428 (V), annex, 8(a), U.N. GAOR,
325th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Dec. 14, 1950).
107. Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 35.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 189-205 (1992) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK], available at http'//www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d58e13b4.pdf,
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution
Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, at 3, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May
7, 2002) [hereinafter Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution], available at
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d58ddef4.pdf.
110. For text and information, see Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 14, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/langeng.pdf.
111. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 286-92 (1999).
112. Id. at 320-24.
2007] 215
216 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 47
Political Rights (ICCPR)"13 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 114 Canada
has ratified both of these treaties,1 5 which include protections
relevant to the treatment of refugees. In addition, these
treaties also contain methods of monitoring and redressing
violations, which will be explored below.
116
B. Regional Protections: The Inter-American Human Rights
Protection System
In addition, countries in the Western Hemisphere'created
a regional regime of human rights protections. Both the
United States and Canada participate in the Organization of
American States (OAS), which administers the human rights
protection system for the Americas." 7 At the heart of this
system is an aspirational declaration, the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American
Declaration)."' This foundational statement gave rise to
treaties providing further protection for refugees, the
American Convention on Human Rights being the preeminent
example.11 9 Further, under the auspices of the OAS, several
enforcement mechanisms operate to monitor and provide a
means of redress for violations of these rights. 2 °
113. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
114. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
115. See United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [UNHCHRI,
Treaty Body Database, Status by Country,
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet (last visited Mar.
6, 2007) (providing information about current treaty ratifications).
116. See infra Part VII.
117. See Org. of Am. States [OAS], The OAS at a Glance,
http://www.oas.org/key-issues/engfKeyIssueDetail.asp?kissec=20 (last visited
Mar. 9, 2007).
118. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res.
XXX, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L./V/I.4 Rev.9 (1965) (adopted by Ninth Int'l
Conference of Am. States, Bogotd, Colombia (1948)) [hereinafter American
Declaration], available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/englishga-
res98/eresl591.htm.
119. See American Convention, supra note 97, 1144 U.N.T.S. at art. 22. For
a fuller list of human rights treaties in the Inter-American system, see Office of
International Law, OAS, Treaties and Agreements: Text of the Inter-American
Treaties, http'//www.oas.org/DIL/treaties-subject.htm (last visited Mar. 6,
2007).
120. See infra Part VII.B.
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C. Domestic Protections: Asylum
Both the United States and Canada adhere to the
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol,'21 and maintain
complex administrative systems designed to assess refugee
claims. Both countries provide the protection of non-
refoulement. 122 In addition, the United States and Canada
also provide asylum, subject to important restrictions. 23 As
noted in the Introduction, the protection of asylum permits a
refugee to remain lawfully in the country granting asylum
until he or she no longer fears persecution or receives another
lawful status (e.g., citizenship). 124  However, at the present
time, asylum is not recognized as a refugee right at the
international level. 25  While the protection of asylum is
recognized in the UDHR and the American Declaration, 26 the
human rights treaties at both the international and the
regional level do not include it. As a consequence, asylum is
perceived to be a privilege rather than a human right that the
United States and Canada are obliged to provide. 27
The receipt of asylum can lead to a more permanent legal
status in both Canada and the United States. In Canada,
121. The United States did not ratify the 1951 Convention, see UNHCR,
United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty2ref.htm (last visited Mar.
10, 2007) (listing ratifying states, a group which does not include the United
States), but all of the legal obligations are binding through the United States'
adoption of the 1967 Protocol. See UNHCR, United Nations Treaty Collection,
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty5.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2007)
(listing the United States as a participant in the 1967 Protocol).
122. In United States law, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(2000), for the provision
against non-refoulement, called 'restriction on removal," and see 8 U.S.C. §§
1158(a)-(d) (2002), for the provision for protection of asylum. Under Canadian
law, see Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C. § 115, ch. 27 (Can.),
for the principle of non-refoulement; Canadian asylum provisions, referred to as
'refugee protection," are found at section 95.
123. As discussed below, the United States imposes time limitations on filing
for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). There are also exceptions to eligibility
if a refugee applicant participated in persecution or committed serious crimes.
See id. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii). Canada likewise has exclusions based upon an
applicant's human rights violations, serious criminality, or security threat. See
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 100.
124. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c) (defining "asylum" under U.S. law).
125. Legomsky, supra note 28, at 612.
126. American Declaration, supra note 118, at art. 27; Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, supra note 110, at art. 14.
127. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 91, at 245-49.
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those granted refugee protection may become a legal
permanent resident. 128 In the United States, however, a
recipient must wait for years before receiving legal
permanent residence.'29 In both countries, the receipt of
permanent legal status permits an asylum recipient's family
members to gain lawful entry to the country granting
asylum130 and further allows for eventual adjustment to
citizenship. 13
1
Under U.S. and Canadian law, the protection of non-
-efoulement may be available to a person even if he or she is
not entitled to asylum. 132  That is, the United States and
Canada may recognize that they may not deport someone to
the country from which he or she fled. However, the
additional benefits of permanent residence do not apply to
those protected by non-refoulement.133  Restrictions and
exclusions found in the Refugee Convention also limit the
protection of non-refoulement.3 4
D. Acceptance of Safe Third Country Agreements in the
International Protection Regime
Since the Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol are
focused on the protection of refugees, they do not explicitly
address safe third country agreements. 135  However,
advocates for safe third country agreements assert that the
concept is implicit in the Refugee Convention. 136 They point
to Article 31, which forbids countries from punishing refugees
128. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 21(2).
129. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1159(a)-(c) (2000).
130. For U.S. law, see id. §§ 1153(a)(2), 1154(a)(1)(A)(ii). For Canadian law,
see Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Library of Parliament,
Canada's Refugee Protection System, July 1993,
http'//www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/bp185-e.htm.
131. For U.S. law, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1501. For Canadian law, see
Citizenship Act, R.S.C., C-29 (1985); Parliamentary Information and Research
Service, supra note 130.
132. For U.S. law, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY 937-39 (4th ed. 2005). For Canadian law, see Parliamentary
Information and Research Service, supra note 130.
133. HATHAWAY, supra note 33, at 301-02.
134. Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at arts. 1(F), 33(2).
135. See generally Refugee Convention, supra note 27; Refugee Protocol,
supra note 91.
136. See Mark Krikorian, Center for Immigration Studies, The U.S.-Canada
Safe Third Country Agreement: A Vital First Step, Oct. 16, 2002,
http'//www.cis.org/articles/2002/msktestimonyl0l6.html.
218 [Vol: 47
UNSAFE IN AMERICA
who, "coming directly from a territory where their life or
freedom was threatened," enter a country without
authorization. 3 7 The argument is that the phrase "coming
directly from the territory" implies that one passing through
a third country can be refused the protections of the Refugee
Convention if the third country is a safe country. While the
UNHCR has yet to formally accept or reject the concept of
safe third country agreements, it has rejected an
interpretation of Article 31 that suggests the drafters of the
Refugee Convention anticipated and recognized safe third
country agreements.13' Rather than condemning safe third
country agreements, the UNHCR recommends safeguards for
their operation.139
Although safe third country agreements are not
specifically prohibited by the Refugee Convention or
international law, experience has demonstrated that there a
number of ways their operation can result in violations of the
Refugee Convention or other human rights protections. 4 °
This prior experience with safe third country agreements has
also produced principles for assessing when a country
returning a refugee applicant may be responsible for another
country's violation of refugee and human rights. As will be
explored in the next section, every country has a duty to
ascertain whether another country will provide minimum
legal protections before returning a refugee to that country.
V. THE PROBLEMS WITH SAFE THIRD COUNTRY AGREEMENTS:
CHAIN REFOULEMENTS, VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
COMPLICITY, AND THE NEED FOR MINIMUM PROTECTIONS
A. Threats to the Protection of Non-Refoulement
Safe third country agreements may result in what are
137. Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 31.
138. UNHCR, UNHCR REVISED GUIDELINES ON APPLICABLE CRITERIA AND
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS (1999). The
UNHCR Guidelines on Detention of Asylum Seekers conclude that the "coming
directly" language was intended to exclude only those asylum seekers who had
settled temporarily in another country. Id. at intro. 4. Asylum seekers who
merely passed through another country are still protected by Article 31. See id.
139. Borchelt, supra note 36, at 515-16.
140. See supra Part II.B.
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referred to as chain refoulements.14 ' A chain refoulement
occurs when a refugee applicant arrives in a destination
country that has a safe third country agreement with a
country through which the person seeking refugee status
passed. 42 The third country, in turn, has a safe third country
agreement with another county through which the refugee
applicant passed earlier." The person seeking refuge is
forced to retrace his or her path of flight, with each
refoulement leading closer to the country which he or she fled.
This practice could amount to a violation of the Refugee
Convention's protection of non-refoulement in two ways;
either no country along the chain of refoulement assesses
whether the person should receive the protection of non-
refoulement,'4 or the countries along the chain have
inadequate or unfair refugee protection systems and
mistakenly conclude that the person seeking protection does
not qualify as a refugee. 145
The European experience with safe third country
agreements reveals that the unfair denial of refugee status
may occur because the third country in question has not
ratified the Refugee Convention and does not participate in
the refugee protection regime administered by the UNHCR. 146
Alternatively, a country may be a party to the Refugee
Convention, but its interpretation of the Convention is at
variance with international standards regarding the
treatment of refugees. 147
As will be explored below, the danger of chain
refoulement under the STCA emerges because the United
States' refugee processing system is at variance with
international standards. These features result in a refugee
applicant not receiving the protection of non-refoulement
141. Legomsky, supra note 28, at 572. Legomsky also identifies another
violation referred to as an "orbit" in which an asylum seeker is shuttled back
and forth between a destination country and a country through which he or she
passed. Id. This scenario emerges in the absence of an agreement between the
destination country and the third country. Id. Thus, safe third country
agreements, if observed, are a solution to this problem. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 583.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 585-86.
146. Id.
147. Legomsky, supra note 28, at 585-86.
220 [Vol: 47
UNSAFE IN AMERICA
when they should. As a consequence, refugee applicants may
be returned to countries in violation of the Refugee
Convention.
B. Threats to Other Refugee and Human Rights
In addition to the protection of non-refoulement, safe
third country agreements may jeopardize other rights that
protect people seeking refugee status. The prolonged and
indefinite detention of refugee applicants is a primary
example, implicating rights under the Refugee Convention as
well as other human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR.145
The failure to provide basic human needs like food and
shelter is another example.'49 The European experience
demonstrates that these rights and many others can be
violated when a chain refoulement occurs. 50 As will be
discussed below, issues of U.S. detention practices and a lack
of basic support for refugees arise under the STCA.
C. The Complicity Principle and Minimum Legal Protections
Before reviewing how the U.S. system is at variance with
international refugee and human rights norms, an important
question must be addressed: Can Canada be held in violation
of its international legal obligations because of U.S. violations
of the Refugee Convention or other human rights treaties?
The answer is yes. A country's non-refoulement obligation
and its obligations to other human rights treaties continue
even after it returns an asylum seeker to a third country.'15
Professor Stephen Legomsky,"52  in an article
commissioned by the UNHCR, examined the legal issues
involved in the movement of refugees after they leave the
148. HATHAWAY, supra note 33, at 370-88.
149. Legomsky, supra note 28, at 586-87.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 618-21.
152. Professor Stephen Legomsky, a well known expert in immigration and
refugee law and policy, is the John S. Lehmann Professor of Law at Washington
University Law School. See Wash. Univ. Law, Short Bio: Stephen H. Legomsky,
http://law.wustl.edu/faculty/index.asp?id=1656 (last visited Mar. 8, 2007)
(providing Legomsky's biography). One of Professor Legomsky's many
professional accomplishments is his current position as senior researcher at the
headquarters of the UNHCR. See id. He has provided expert testimony before
the U.S. Congress and many foreign governments on migration, refugee and
citizenship matters. See id.
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country of persecution, including movement compelled by safe
third country agreements. ' In this article, he identified
several principles that frame the analysis of when a country
may properly return a refugee applicant to a third country.
The key principle in his analysis is what he deemed the
"complicity principle." 154 The complicity principle holds that a
second country cannot knowingly remove someone seeking
refugee status to any third country which would subject that
person to treatment that would constitute a violation of the
second country's international obligations. 155  Many
international bodies, including the United Nations General
Assembly and the UNHCR, agree with this principle. 56
Further, the complicity principle is recognized by many
countries, 157 including the United States and Canada.
5 8
Professor Legomsky further proposed a set of minimum
legal requirements that a third country must meet before a
person seeking refugee status may be returned by a second
country.' 59  For the purpose of analyzing the STCA, this
article will focus on four of the minimum requirements he
identifies. 160  First, the destination country may not return
153. Legomsky, supra note 28, 567.
154. Id. at 620. Professor Legomsky relied in part upon the Articles on State
Responsibility developed by the International Law Commission to articulate
this principle. Id. He further bolsters this principle through the application of
the object and purpose clause of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties.
Id. That is, the Vienna Convention provides the background for reading the
1951 Convention, and one of its basic principles is that a treaty's provisions
must be read consistently with the treaty's object and purpose. Id. Allowing a
country to avoid its obligations to refugees by simply returning them to another
country that will then return them to a place of persecution would be contrary
to the purposes of the Refugee Convention. Id. Legomsky distilled further
support for the complicity theory from the use of analogous reasoning by
authoritative international bodies in several other specific human rights
contexts. Id.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 618-21.
157. See id.
158. See Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R.
177 (Can.); see also Macklin, supra note 9, at 399 (discussing Canadian law
adopting the complicity principle).
159. Legomsky, supra note 28, at 673-75.
160. Legomsky identifies a total of nine minimum legal requirements. See
id. First, the third country agrees to readmit the refugee applicant. See id. at
673. Second, the applicant has no well-founded fear of persecution in the third
country. See id. For a discussion of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth criteria,
see id. at 673-74. Seventh, the third country will provide effective protection.
See id. at 674. Eighth, family unity is recognized as trumping other interests in
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the refugee applicant to the third country if the destination
country has interpreted a provision of the Refugee
Convention in a way that would forbid refoulement, the third
country has a more limited interpretation such that the
applicant would not receive the protection of non-refoulement,
and the destination country considers the provision to have
only one possible interpretation.'61 Second, the destination
country knows the third country will violate other Refugee
Convention rights.162 Here, the degree of certainty in the
term "knowingly" is inversely related to the importance of the
Convention right at stake.'63 Third, the destination country
knows the third country will violate an asylum seeker's rights
protected under a human rights treaty to which the
destination country is a party.'64 Again, the degree of
certainty is inversely related to the right at stake.165 Fourth,
the third country will not provide a fair refugee status
determination. 166
Equipped with this framework of minimum legal
protections emerging from the complicity principle, we may
assess whether Canada will violate its obligations under the
Refugee Convention by returning a refugee applicant to the
United States. We will explore the ways the U.S. refugee
processing system fails to meet the minimum legal
protections guidelines.
VI. ASSESSING WHEN CANADA WILL VIOLATE ITS
OBLIGATIONS BY RETURNING A REFUGEE APPLICANT TO THE
UNITED STATES UNDER THE STCA
This section will apply Professor Legomksy's minimum
legal protection principles to identify Canada's accountability
if it returns a refugee applicant to the United States when it
is not safe to do so. The application of the minimum legal
protection principles to the STCA reveals clear violations by
the United States as well as features of the U.S. system that
returning the refugee applicant. See id. at 674-75. Ninth, the destination
country will apply the above criteria on a case by case basis. See id. at 675.
161. See id. at 673.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 674.
165. See Legomsky, supra note 28, at 674.
166. See id. at 674.
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may not rise to level of clear violations, but generate concerns
that the United States may be unsafe nonetheless.
A. Threats to the Protection of Non-Refoulement
This section explores the ways in which the U.S. refugee
protection system may fail to provide the protection of non-
refoulement found in the Refugee Convention and in other
human rights treaties.'67 A violation of the protection of non-
refoulement means that the United States wrongfully returns
a refugee applicant to a country where he or she may be
persecuted.168 Hence, Canada would be engaged in a chain
refoulement by returning a refugee applicant to the United
States under the STCA.
1. Clear Violations of Minimum Protection Principles
a. A Higher Burden of Proof for Receiving the
Protection of Non-Refoulement
The United States adopts the definition of "refugee"
found in the Refugee Convention 169 for the purpose of
assessing who may receive asylum in the United States.
70
However, the United States does not use this same definition
of "refugee" when it comes to assessing who may receive the
protection of non-refoulement.'7' As a consequence, the
United States places a higher burden of proof on those
seeking the protection of non-refoulement as compared to
those claiming to be refugees. This difference amounts to a
violation of the Refugee Convention.
The provision for non-refoulement in U.S. law, commonly
known by its former name, "withholding of deportation"
172
(withholding), does not provide protection for those claiming
to be refugees. Rather, the United States' non-refoulement
provision provides that "[tihe Attorney General may not
remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides
that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that
167. See supra Part IV.A.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
169. See Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 1.
170. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
171. Id. § 1231(b)(3) (prior version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (repealed 1994))
(restricting removal).
172. Id.
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country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. "173 The U.S. non-refoulement provision makes no
reference to refugees, 74 only to aliens. 175 There are several
important consequences to detaching the refugee definition
from the protection of withholding under U.S. law. Most
importantly, withholding has a heightened evidentiary
burden as compared to asylum. 1
76
In order to make a case for withholding, an applicant
must demonstrate by a clear probability of the evidence that
his or her life or freedom would be threatened. 177 However, to
receive the protection of asylum, the applicant must only
qualify as a refugee, which requires demonstrating a well-
founded fear of persecution. 178  In order to demonstrate a
well-founded fear of persecution, an applicant must
demonstrate a reasonable possibility of persecution. 179  In
numeric terms, an applicant for withholding must show a
better than fifty percent chance that his or her life or freedom
would be threatened in the country to which he or she would
be returned. 8 0  By contrast, under the asylum system, the
risk of persecution could be considerably less than fifty
percent, but still satisfy the reasonable possibility of
173. Id.
174. Cf. Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 33 (defining "refugee").
175. An alien is any person who is not a citizen or a national of the United
States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).
176. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 422 (1984) (explaining that withholding
of deportation is required only if the alien's life or freedom "would" be
threatened, but not if the alien "might" or "could" be subject to persecution).
177. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this interpretation in 1984. See id.
U.S. law places a higher evidentiary burden on applicants seeking restriction on
removal because Congress's intent when codifying the United States'
international obligation was to retain the objective standard of showing it was
more probable than not that the applicant's life or freedom would be threatened.
See id. at 425-26. Congress, according to the Supreme Court, saw this as
consistent with the non-refoulement obligations under the 1951 Refugee
Convention. See id. at 426-28.
178. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (defining "refugee").
179. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (holding that,
consistent with the 1967 Protocol, it is enough to show that persecution is a
reasonable probability).
180. The U.S. Supreme Court articulated this as the standard in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 423 ("[Aln alien must
demonstrate that 'it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to
persecution' in the country to which he would be returned." (citing INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984))).
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persecution, thereby qualifying the applicant for refugee
status.'l '
Applying Legomsky's proposed minimum legal
requirements, 182 Canada would be prohibited from returning
a refugee applicant to the United States if Canada knew the
United States would refoule that applicant due its differing
interpretation of the Refugee Convention. 83 However, if
Canada considered the provision at issue to be susceptible to
several interpretations, Canada could return the applicant to
the United States if the United States' interpretation of the
provision were permissible." 4  This raises the question of
whether the non-refoulement provision of the Refugee
Convention' 8  has only one permissible interpretation
regarding the burden of proof on the refugee to prove a threat
to his or her life or freedom.
The Refugee Convention does not articulate the
evidentiary burden of proof that an applicant must meet in
order to demonstrate a threat to his or her life or freedom.
8 6
However, this does not lead to the conclusion that the burden
of proof in the Refugee Convention's non-refoulement
provision is susceptible to multiple interpretations. The
Refugee Convention uses the term "refugee" throughout the
Convention without qualification.8 7 The Refugee Convention
uses the well-founded fear standard consistently.' 8 Scholars
and critics point out that the United States is alone in
imposing a different burden of proof for non-refoulement than
for asylum. 9 These differing burdens of proof result in the
United States protecting only a sub-group of refugees from
refoulement.9 ° In effect, an applicant must show more than a
181. See id. Additionally, one who is granted withholding is not entitled to
other refugee rights under the Refugee Convention. See Hathaway & Cusick,
supra note 105, at 515.
182. See supra Part V.C.
183. Legomsky, supra note 28, at 673.
184. See id.
185. See Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 33.
186. See generally Refugee Convention, supra note 27.
187. See Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 1(A); see also Hathaway
& Cusick, supra note 105, at 523.
188. See Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 1(A).
189. Leena Khandwala et al., 05-08 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 11-2 (2005) (citing
Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 1, 3 (1997)).
190. See Hathaway & Cusick, supra note 105, at 515. Well-known refugee
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well-founded fear of persecution in order to receive the
protection of withholding under U.S. law. Thus, the United
States' imposition of a higher burden to receive the protection
of non-refoulement runs contrary to the burden of proof for
the protection of non-refoulement that is set forth by the
Refugee Convention.'9 1  Under the complicity principle,
Canada cannot return a refugee applicant to the United
States if he or she would face the heightened burden of proof
to qualify for non-refoulement.
A refugee applicant is forced to apply for withholding
when he or she cannot ask for asylum in the United States.
Refugee applicants are prohibited from applying for asylum
in several situations. One large category of people denied the
right to request asylum is those who file more than one year
after arriving in the United States.'92 Another significant
category consists of those applicants barred from asking for
asylum because of criminal conduct or ties to terrorist
organizations, among other reasons.1 93 However, the scope of
criminal and terrorism bars generates another ground for
concluding that the United States is unsafe because it fails to
provide minimum legal protections.
b. Exclusion from Receiving Protection: Criminal
Grounds
The United States bars refugee applicants from the
protection of asylum and from withholding if the refugee
applicant has been convicted of a particularly serious crime
and presents a danger to the United States, or if there are
reasons to think the applicant committed a serious
nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to his or
her arrival in the United States.' 94 While the United States
follows the language of the Refugee Convention for these
exclusions, 95 it diverges from most other countries with
scholar Professor James Hathaway refers to those receiving withholding under
U.S. law as "super-refugees." Id.
191. See id. at 525.
192. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2003).
193. See id. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)-(C).
194. Id. 88 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (iii); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii)-(iii) (1997).
195. Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 33. Article 33 excludes those
reasonably believed to be a danger to the security of the United States, those
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, and those who
constitute a danger to the community of the country in which protection is
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regard to the scope of these exclusions. As will be explored
below, the United States' interpretation of these exclusions is
so broad as to be contrary to the Refugee Convention.
The U.S. provision on withholding denies the protection
of non-refoulement if "the alien, having been convicted by a
final judgment of a particularly serious crime is a danger to
the community of the United States."196 The United States
takes a categorical approach when it comes to defining the
term "particularly serious crime." United States law declares
a set of crimes, referred to in U.S. immigration law as
aggravated felonies,'97 to be "particularly serious" if the alien
is sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of five or
more years upon conviction. 9 ' Despite this guideline, the
U.S. government may still determine that the crime is
particularly serious even in cases of aggravated felonies in
which the sentence is less than five years.' 99
However, the term "aggravated felony" in U.S.
immigration law covers a series of non-violent crimes that are
not aggravated or a felony. United States immigration law
defines an aggravated felony by means of a list of crimes that
has expanded dramatically in recent years.20 0  Receiving
stolen property, committing fraud, forging or destroying a
passport, and bribery are all aggravated felonies under U.S.
immigration law.2 10  Recently, the U.S. administrative
agencies concluded that-driving a stolen car could be an
aggravated felony. °2
Further, the United States holds that aggravated felonies
are particularly serious crimes, thereby creating a
presumption that the person is dangerous to the
community.0 3 Therefore, there is no independent assessment
sought. Id.
196. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).
197. Id. §§ 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U).
198. Id. § 1231(b)(3)(B).
199. See id.
200. See Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration
Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611,631-35 (2003).
201. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(G), (M), (P), (R); see also Kathleen Keller, A
Comparative and International Law Perspective on the United States
(Non)Compliance with Its Duty of Non-Refoulement, 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV.
L.J. 183, 198-200 (1999).
202. In re Brieva, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (B.I.A. 2005) (sentencing an alien to
five years).
203. Keller, supra note 201, at 196-97.
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of whether a person presents a danger to the United States
based upon the crime. The applicant is simply denied the
protection of asylum or withholding and faces removal from
the United States even if he or she can establish a likelihood
of persecution or a threat to life or freedom.2"4
Under the second ground of criminal exclusion from
protection, the United States will deny asylum and
withholding if there are "serious reasons to believe that the
alien committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the
United States before the alien arrived in the United
States."2"' When applying this exclusion, the United States
refuses to balance the risks of persecution against the
seriousness of the crime.20 6 This approach was upheld by the
U.S. Supreme Court.20 7
The U.S. approach runs contrary to the accepted
understanding of the Refugee Convention, as articulated by
the UNHCR guidelines and the practices of other countries,
including Canada.20 8  Scholars such as Professor James
Hathaway have noted that the term "serious crime" was
intended to capture acts that involve violence against
persons, such as murder, rape, child molesting, and drug
trafficking.2 9 Further, the crime should be assessed by
taking into account all mitigating factors and other
circumstances, 210 including the risk of persecution the
applicant would face if returned.211  Lastly, the Refugee
Convention requires that a country make an independent
assessment as to whether the refugee applicant is a danger to
the community.212 Refoulement on the basis of criminality is a
"last resort" when the applicant poses an extremely high risk
to the community and there is no other way to protect it. 213
Thus, the U.S. practices of ignoring the circumstances and
204. Id.; see also LEGOMSKY, supra note 132, at 1070-73 (citing Matter of
Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1986)).
205. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii).
206. Keller, supra note 201, at 200-01.
207. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
208. HATHAWAY, supra note 33, at 349-55; see also Keller, supra note 201, at
189-90 (citing Re Chu and Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 161 D.L.R.
4th 499 (Fed. Ct. 1998)).
209. HATHAWAY, supra note 33, at 349.
210. Id. at 350.
211. Keller, supra note 201, at 201, 207.
212. HATHAWAY, supra note 33, at 351.
213. Id. at 352.
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taking a categorical approach to defining particularly serious
crimes (which include non-violent and property offenses),
rejecting any separate analysis of whether a refugee
applicant is a threat to the community, and not considering
the risks of persecution the applicant faces, are all
inconsistent with the Refugee Convention.
The United States' overly broad criminal exclusions
violate the minimum legal requirements criteria. Canada
may not send back a refugee applicant if the United States'
interpretation of the Refugee Convention is narrower than
Canada's and pertains to a matter on which Canada considers
there to be one standard.214 While Canada may consider the
criminal exclusion grounds of the Refugee Convention to be
susceptible to more than one interpretation, international law
places limits on how nations interpret their treaty
obligations.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna
Convention) was created to codify international law on treaty
formation, observance and interpretation.2 15 Canada ratified
the Vienna Convention and is therefore bound by its
provisions.216 According to the Vienna Convention, state
parties must interpret a treaty in "good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose."217  Thus, Canada cannot interpret its obligations
under the Refugee Convention in a manner that is
inconsistent with its object and purpose. Further, under the
complicity principle, Canada must ensure that the United
States' interpretation of the Refugee Convention is in good
faith and in a manner consistent with its object and purpose
214. Legomsky, supra note 28, at 673-77.
215. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention], available at
httpJ/untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1 1_1969.pdf.
216. See Department of Foreign Affairs, Canada, Canada Treaty Information,
httpJ/www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/Details.asp?TreatyjD=104068 (last visited Feb.
5, 2007).
217. Vienna Convention, supra note 215, at art. 31. The UNHCR Executive
Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme (ExCom), in a report on the
50th anniversary of the Refugee Convention's adoption, confirmed that the
Vienna Convention should guide all parties in their interpretation of the
Refugee Convention. See UNHCR Exec. Comm. of the High Commissioner's
Programme [ExCom], Note on International Protection, at 3, A/Ac.96/951 (Sept.
13, 2001). For information on the Executive Committee, see infra note 490.
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before returning a refugee applicant to the United States.218
The United States' interpretation cannot be considered in
good faith given the object and purpose of the Refugee
Convention. The object and purpose of the Refugee
Convention is to provide protection to refugees. 219  This
should only be denied if the refugee truly represents a threat
to the community based upon the commission of a violent
crime. 2 0 The United States' interpretation of the criminal
exclusion includes non-violent crimes and presumes that a
refugee applicant is a danger to the community, rather than
providing for a case by case assessment of danger posed by
the applicant. Additionally, the U.S. criminal exclusion
grounds do not consider the circumstances of each case to
determine if there are alternatives to denying the protection
of non-refoulement" As a result, Canada cannot uphold its
obligations under the Refugee Convention if it returns a
refugee applicant to the United States who would then be
barred from protection because of exclusions inconsistent
with the object and purpose of the treaty. If it does, Canada
becomes complicit in the United States' bad faith
interpretation and violates the Refugee Convention.
It should be noted that Canada's regulations
implementing the STCA already recognize a limited
application of the complicity principle in this area. The
Canadian procedural manual for processing refugee claims
states that the STCA will not be applied to someone who
would be "denied deferral of removal by the United States due
to serious criminality."22  The protection of deferral of
218. See Vienna Convention, supra note 215, at art. 31(1) (setting out the
general rule of treaty interpretation).
219. Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at preamble.
220. See HATHAWAY, supra note 33, at 352.
221. Keller, supra note 201, at 201.
222. See CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CAN., supra note 80, at 10-11
(designating such person a "[pierson in need of protection"). Deferral of removal
is permitted under U.S. law when an alien can show it is more probable than
not he or she will be tortured. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.17 (2005). This provision was
enacted to make U.S. law consistent with its intentional legal obligations under
the Convention Against Torture. See Regulations Concerning the Convention
Against Torture; Interim Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 8278, 8479 (1999) (to be codified at
8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (stating that the rule's purpose was to ensure that alien
removal in the United States was consistent with Article 3 of the Convention
Against Torture). However, the provision in the Canadian processing manual is
odd because there are no criminal bars to deferral of removal. See CITIZENSHIP
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removal in U.S. law applies to those who would face torture if
returned to their own country. 2 3 Thus, if someone faces the
probability of torture if returned to his or her own country,
and the United States would deny them the protection of non-
refoulement due to serious criminality, Canada will not apply
the STCA. Instead, Canada will process the application for
protection.224 Presumably, this exception to the STCA is
based upon the recognition that U.S. laws limiting protection
on criminal grounds are inconsistent with international law.
However, this exception as worded only applies to those
facing torture.225 Canada must address this lacuna in its
regulations and broaden this provision to cover everyone who
should receive the protection of non-refoulement in the United
States, but will be denied under the criminal exclusions.
c. Exclusion from Receiving Protection: The
Terrorism Provisions
The United States also bars those who engage in, or have
engaged in, terrorist activities from receiving the protection of
non-refoulement.226 The Refugee Convention does not contain
a specific exception for terrorism. However, it does contain
an exception to protection for those who pose a security threat
to the country in which they seek protection.227 Although
such a bar does not seem unreasonable, the definition of
"terrorist activity" in U.S. immigration law goes well beyond
the activities and individuals the drafters of the Refugee
Convention would have considered a threat to security.
228
AND IMMIGRATION CAN., supra note 80, at 83 (stating only that persons denied
admission to the United States could face a report of inadmissibility if
criminality is involved). In fact, deferral of removal is a protection that exists in
the event someone is denied withholding of removal because of criminality. See
8 C.F.R. § 208.17(a).
223. 8 C.F.R. § 208.17.
224. See CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CAN., supra note 80, at 82-83.
225. As noted above, deferral of removal in U.S. law protects those who face
torture if returned to their country of origin. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.17. It is
possible the Canadian processing manual did not intend to use the word in the
same way it is used in U.S. law. However, taking the manual as worded, it does
not broadly apply to those denied non-refoulement.
226. See 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V) (2005). As with the criminal bars,
there is a limited exception to these bars-when it is more likely than not that
the person will be tortured if returned to first country. See infra notes 608-09.
227. Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 33(2).
228. Hathway & Cusick, supra note 105, at 536-37; Keller supra note 201, at
202-03.
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Under U.S. law, terrorist activity includes a very wide
range of conduct. For instance, it includes the use of a
"dangerous device . . . with the intent to endanger"
individuals or property other than for mere personal gain.229
However, this definition could easily include conduct that
does not represent a threat to U.S. security.23 °
Further, membership in a terrorist organization
generally bars admissibility to the United States,231 and U.S.
law does not distinguish organizations based the context of
the conflict.232 Thus, groups defending themselves from
systematic discrimination, crimes against humanity or
genocide could fall within this definition.233 Additionally, a
refugee applicant has little opportunity to demonstrate that
he or she lacked knowledge about the organization's terrorist
purposes,23 4 and even then this lack of knowledge must be
proven by "clear and convincing evidence."2 35
Lastly, the terrorism bar includes providing material
support to a terrorist organization.236 If a refugee applicant is
found to have knowingly provided aid to a terrorist
organization, he or she is barred from the protection of non-
refoulement.23 7  The list of types of aid is not exhaustive,
229. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2005 & Supp. 2006). This provision is made
applicable through the withholding provision in U.S. law, see 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(B) (2005), which references 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B).
230. Hathway & Cusick, supra note 105, at 536-38; Keller, supra note 201, at
202-03.
231. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V) (2005 & Supp. 2006).
232. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE CLINIC & INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC,
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON THE
MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM BAR AS APPLIED TO THE OVERSEAS
RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES FROM BURMA 3 (2006) [hereinafter HARVARD
STUDY], available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06619-asy-mat-sup-
terr-bar-study.pdf.
233. Id.
234. The term "terrorist organization" is defined by reference to three types
of groups: (1) those designated under 8 U.S.C. § 1189; (2) those designated by
the Secretary of State and published in the Federal Register; and (3) those in
which two or more members engaged in terrorist activities. See 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(vi) (2005 & Supp. 2006).
235. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI) (2005) (stating that a person can only
claim lack of knowledge to avoid the terrorism bar if he or she is allegedly a
member of a terrorist "organization," defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III)
as a "group of two or more individuals").
236. See id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
237. Id. Material support includes "a safe house, transportation,
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit,
false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological,
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however, and could include humanitarian assistance.238 More
importantly, the bar for providing material support does not
contain an exception for support given under duress or an
exception for de minimis support.239 It does not matter how
far in the past the support was given or whether the refuge
intended to support a terrorist organization.2 40 The material
support bar has significantly reduced the number of refugees
receiving protection in the United States.24' Studies
demonstrate that legitimate refugees have been denied
protection even though they were victims of governmental
persecution and did not pose a threat to the security of the
United States.242
As with the criminal exclusions to protection, the
terrorism bar in U.S. law violates the minimum legal
requirements criteria. Canada cannot return a refugee
applicant to the United States if the United States interprets
the Refugee Convention in a fashion contrary to the object
and purpose of the Refugee Convention. The U.S. terrorism
grounds deny the protection of non-refoulement to bona fide
refugees who pose no threat to the United States.
Consequently, Canada cannot fulfill its obligations under
international law when it returns a refugee applicant who
faces refoulement under the terrorism bar.
The United States' "war on terror" has also spawned
practices which create further cause to fear that refugee
applicants will be sent back to the county of origin without
consideration of their refugee claim. A prime example is the
or radiological weapons), explosives, or training." Id.
238. HARVARD STUDY, supra note 232, at 2. The Harvard Study cites a case
in which a refugee was barred from protection because he gave food and shelter
to members of a terrorist organization participating in a religious gathering. Id.
at 2 n.8 (citing Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004)).
239. HARVARD STUDY, supra note 232, at 3-4; see also HUMAN RIGHTS INST.,
GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: REFUGEE
VICTIMS OF THE WAR ON TERROR 1 (2006) [hereinafter GEORGETOWN STUDY],
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/releases/documents/UnintendedConseque
nces-RefugeeVictimsoftheWaronTerror.pdf.
240. See HARVARD STUDY, supra note 232, at 4.
241. Rachael Swains, Terror Laws Cut Resettlement of Refugees, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2006, at A21.
242. See generally GEORGETOWN STUDY, supra note 239 (examining the
impact of the material support bar on Colombian refugees); HARVARD STUDY,
supra note 232 (examining the impact of the material support bar on Burmese
refugees). An exception was granted to a limited number of Burmese refugees
who opposed the government. See Swarns, supra note 241.
234 [Vol: 47
UNSAFE IN AMERICA
United States' policy of rendition, a practice in which non-
citizens are sent from the United States to countries where
there is significant risk they will be tortured.243 Rendition is
a term covering a process whereby one country sends an
individual to another country for any number of purposes in
disregard of domestic and international law.2 " In the context
of the war on terrorism, the United States has used rendition
to detain and interrogate individuals outside of the
international criminal law framework.245 The victims of this
practice number in the thousands.246
In a recent well-known case of rendition, Maher Arar, a
Canadian citizen, arrived in the United States en route to
Canada.247 Instead of allowing him to travel on, the United
States sent him to Syria, his birthplace.248 Arar was tortured
in Syria in an attempt to determine whether he knew
anything about terrorist plans.249 While Arar was not seeking
refugee protection in the United States, and rendition is
forbidden under the STCA,25° this incident demonstrates the
willingness of United States to flout its international
obligations under human rights laws and potentially the
STCA's ban on rendition. The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)2 1 and the Convention
Against Torture,252 both of which the United States and
Canada ratified,253 forbid this practice. The U.S. government
243. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, at
106; see also Scott Shane, Detainee's Suit Gains Support From Jet's Log, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2005, at Al.
244. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against
Terrorism: Guantenamo and Beyond, 25 LOY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 457
(2003).
245. Id. at 467-68.
246. Id. at 459-60.
247. See Shane, supra note 243.
248. Mayer, supra note 243, at 106.
249. See Shane, supra note 243.
250. Safe Third Country Agreement, supra note 12, at art. 3.
251. ICCPR, supra note 113, at art. 7.
252. CAT, supra note 97, at art. 3.
253. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
[OHCHR], International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights New York, 16
December 1966, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm (last
visited Mar. 8, 2007) (listing current ratification status for the ICCPR);
OHCHR, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, New York, 10 December 1984,
httpJ/www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/9.htm (last visited Mar. 8,
2007) (listing the current ratification status for the CAT).
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contends that such renditions occurring in the context of the
war on terrorism are lawful. 254 This argument could just as
easily be applied in the refugee context under the STCA.
The Arar case also demonstrates an application of the
complicity principle. The international body established to
monitor the CAT, the Committee Against Torture (CAT),
found that Canadian authorities played a role in Arar's
rendition, implicating Canada's responsibility under the
CAT.2 55 According to the Committee Against Torture, Canada
had an obligation to do more to prevent Arar's rendition even
though the United States actually engaged in the practice.256
This obligation arose because Canada's obligation under the
CAT prevents Canada from assisting in a violation of its
provisions.
2. Arguable Violations of the Minimum Legal
Requirements
The above features of the U.S. refugee processing system
reveal clear violations of the minimum legal requirements
criteria because of the United States' impermissible
interpretations of the Refugee Convention. The following
features of the U.S. refugee protection system are more
difficult to analyze under the minimum legal requirements
criteria. However, these features also generate questions of
whether the United States employs an impermissibly narrow
interpretation of the Refugee Convention. Additionally, the
features discussed below will raise questions as to whether
the U.S. refugee protection system as a whole functions so
unfairly as to deprive applicants of an accurate determination
of their refugee status.
254. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 244, at 461.
255. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of
Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, at 2,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/8l/Add.3 (Nov. 4, 2004), available at
http:/www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586bldc7b443c1256a450044f331/93896f2f
7b045cbdc125702a00364545/$FILE/G0444332.pdf; see also Lisa Schlein,
Canada Rebuked for Allowing Torture, TORONTO STAR (Can.), May 21, 2005, at
A12.
256. See CAT, supra note 97, at art. 9.
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a. Corroborating Evidence and Credibility
Determinations
In 2005, the U.S. Congress enacted the REAL ID Act
(REAL ID), which changed the evidentiary burdens that
refugee applicants face when trying to prove their refugee
claims before U.S. immigration judges.257  It allows
immigration judges to require a refugee applicant to provide
corroborating evidence even if the applicant already
presented credible testimony regarding his or her claim.258
REAL ID also permits an immigration judge to base
credibility determinations on the demeanor, candor or
responsiveness of the applicant or witnesses, as well as
factors such as the "inherent plausibility" of an applicant's or
a witness's account. 25 9  Further, immigration judges may
make adverse credibility findings based upon inconsistencies
and inaccuracies in a refugee applicant's claim even if those
inconsistencies and inaccuracies are not central to the
claim.2 60 An adverse credibility finding or a failure to provide
corroborating evidence results in a denial of the refugee
applicant's claim and a denial of protection.26'
Determining the credibility of a refugee applicant is
crucial to the process of providing refugee protection.262 As
courts and scholars have noted, genuine refugees will rarely
be able to offer direct corroboration of threats or incidents of
persecution.263 Often, refugee applicants will have little but
their testimony to support their assertions of persecution.2 "4
For this reason, the UNHCR provides guidelines that balance
the interest of accurate adjudication with the practical
difficulties that refugees face in providing evidence other than
their own testimony.265
A recent study of the STCA by the Harvard Law School
asserts that the REAL ID provisions run afoul of
257. REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. LEGOMSKY, supra note 132, at 1057.
263. Id. at 1056 (citing Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir. 1987)).
264. See Joanna Ruppel, The Need for a Benefit of the Doubt Standard in
Credibility Evaluations of Asylum Applicants, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1,
2-3 (1992).
265. See HANDBOOK, supra note 109, 189-205.
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international standards reflected in the UNHCR
guidelines.266 First, the UNHCR guidelines state that an
applicant's untrue statements, by themselves, should not be
the basis for a denial of protection.267 Second, the guidelines
articulate the general principle that the benefit of the doubt
should be given to an applicant because it is impossible to
substantiate every aspect of his or her story.268  The
provisions of REAL ID, the study argues, allow untrue
statements to be the basis of a denial of protection and permit
judges to require corroboration in cases in which it is not
possible.269
Applying the minimum legal requirements criteria to this
issue, it is debatable whether the REAL ID provisions are an
impermissibly narrow interpretation of the Refugee
Convention. The REAL ID provision on corroborating
evidence does not require such evidence in all cases and
recognizes that an applicant's testimony alone may be
sufficient if it is credible, persuasive and specific.2 70 Further,
an applicant may demonstrate that corroborating evidence is
unavailable when it is requested by the immigration judge.2
Determinations of credibility, according to REAL ID, are
made on the totality of the circumstances, which may include
false statements as well as other factors. 2 2  The REAL ID
provisions give the immigration judge a variety of factors
upon which to base a credibility determination.2 3  This is
consistent with UNHCR guidelines which state that the
benefit of the doubt given to refugee applicants applies only
after all available evidence is obtained and verified, and
general credibility is established.274
b. Limitation on Protection: Gender-Based Claims
Critics of the STCA assert that the U.S. refugee
protection system departs from international standards in its
266. BORDERING ON FAILURE, supra note 84, at 13.
267. Id. (citing HANDBOOK supra note 109, 1 199).
268. Id. (citing HANDBOOK supra note 109, 196).
269. Id.
270. REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005).
271. See id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. HANDBOOK, supra note 109, 204.
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treatment of gender-based refugee claims. 5  As will be
explored below, the particular concern is that the United
States will not adequately protect victims of domestic violence
and, more broadly, will deny gender-based refugee claims
that would be successful in Canada.
The Refugee Convention's definition of a refugee does not
include gender as a ground under which a person can claim
protection from persecution.2 7 6 Women facing gender-based
persecution must therefore fit their claims into one of the
Refugee Convention's identified grounds for persecution that
establishes refugee status: race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group and political
277opinion. There are a wide variety of ways women can be
particularly vulnerable to persecution or threats to life or
freedom, including domestic abuse.2 8 Domestic abuse claims
are particularly complicated because the persecutor is more
likely the spouse rather than a government official,279 and the
refugee applicant must show that the persecution is on
account of one of the enumerated grounds.2 °
To help nations adhere to their Refugee Convention
obligations, the UNHCR established guidelines on gender
related claims, most recently in 2002.21 These guidelines
designate domestic violence as a particular way in which
women and girls can become refugees.2 2  The UNHCR
guidelines also assert that persecution can occur at the hands
275. See CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES, CLOSING THE FRONT DOOR ON
REFUGEES, REPORT ON SAFE THIRD COUNTRY AGREEMENT 6 MONTHS AFTER
IMPLEMENTATION 18-19 (2005) [hereinafter 6 MONTH REPORT], available at
http'//www.web.ca/ccr/closingdooraug05.pdf.
276. See Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 1.
277. See generally Refugee Convention, supra note 27.
278. Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, supra note 109, at 3.
279. See HANDBOOK, supra note 109, 65. The Refugee Convention normally
considers government action as amounting to persecution rather than the
purely private conduct of non-governmental actors. See id.
280. See David A. Martin & Yvonne Lamoureux, Treatment of Gender-Based
Asylum Claims in the United States: Memorandum Prepared for the Attorney
General of Canada, Mar. 31, 2003, at pt. II.A-G, at
http://www.cic.gc.ca/englishlpolicy/asylum-gender-us.html.
281. Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, supra note 109, at 1.
282. Amy Y. Arnett, Comment, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Women
Asylum-Seekers in the United States and Canada Stand to Lose Human Rights
Under the Safe Third Country Agreement, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 951, 954-55
(2005).
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of a non-state actor, such as an abusive husband." 3 Finally,
the guidelines explicitly recognize that sex can be a
characteristic that comprises a particular social group and
that women, as a gender, can be a subset of this particular
social group.2 s4
Canada's domestic refugee processing system conforms
closely to these guidelines.285 Canada recognizes battered
women as refugees when their country of nationality or
residence refuses to protect them from an abusive spouse or
partner.2 6 Thus, persecution can occur at the hands of non-
governmental actors if the government is not willing to
protect women from domestic abuse.28 7 Further, battered
women comprise a particular social group, which is one of the
recognized grounds for persecution in the Refugee
Convention. 28  As a result, Canada has a well-established
acceptance of gender-based claims on the basis of domestic
violence.289
The United States, on the other hand, is currently
unsettled on whether women who suffer from domestic
violence can be considered members of a particular social
group.290 In 1999, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)291
rendered a decision that is arguably contrary to the
aforementioned guidelines.292 In In re R-A-,293 a Guatemalan
woman sought refugee status because she was abused by her
husband and the government failed to protect her.294
Overruling the immigration judge, the BIA held that the
refugee applicant was not a member of a particular social
group and that therefore, the severe harm she suffered was
not on account of a ground recognized by the Refugee
283. Id. at 964; see also Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, supra note
109, at 5.
284. Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, supra note 109, at 7.
285. Arnett, supra note 282, at 967.
286. Id. at 965-70.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 970.
290. See Martin & Lamoureux, supra note 280.
291. The Board of Immigration Appeals is the U.S. administrative agency
that hears appeals from the immigration courts. LEGOMSKY, supra note 132,
641-42.
292. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999).
293. Id.
294. Id.
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Convention. 295 However, the decision was withdrawn pending
the establishment of guidelines that have yet to be
released.29 Although there are BIA decisions that recognize
that domestic violence situations can give rise to refugee
status,297 an argument may be made that the lack of clear
precedent and guidelines in the U.S. system leads to
inconsistent results.298
Concerns regarding inconsistent results reveal a larger
issue beyond the treatment of domestic violence claims.
Critics assert that there is a disparity in approval rates
between the United States and Canada with regards to
gender-based asylum claims, and as a result, women will lose
claims for protection in the United States that they would
have otherwise won in Canada because the United States is
less willing to acknowledge gender-based refugee claims.299
The Canadian government was concerned about such a result
when it drafted its implementing regulations, 30 0  and
commissioned a study by refugee law scholar, Professor David
Martin, to examine this issue.30' Professor Martin concluded
that gender-based violence claims filed in the United States
have a high rate of success based upon the data available.0 2
295. Id. The applicant, Rodi Alvarado, asserted that she belonged to the
particular social group of Guatemalan women who have been involved
intimately with male Guatemalan companions, who believe that women are to
live under male domination. Id. at 907. The immigration judge agreed and
held that Ms. Alvarado was persecuted by her husband on the basis of her
political opinion that she objected to male domination. Id. at 911. The BIA
overturned the immigration judge's decision on the basis that Ms. Alvarado did
not establish the existence of particular social group of Guatemalan women, nor
was her husband persecuting her because of her political opinion that women
should not be dominated by men. Id. at 907. The BIA did not doubt that Ms.
Alvarado's husband's abuse rose to the level of persecution or that the
government failed to protect her. Id. at 914. A representative of the UNHCR
wrote to the then-Attorney General, John Ashcroft, expressing the view that
Rodi Alvarado clearly fit within the definition of refugee, entitling her to
protection. Arnett, supra note 282, at 961-65.
296. See CLOSING THE FRONT DOOR, supra note 1, at 17.
297. Martin & Lamoureux, supra note 280.
298. Arnett, supra note 282, at 977-78.
299. See 6 MONTH REPORT, supra note 275.
300. Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations, Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, 136 CAN. GAZETTE 3241,
Oct. 26, 2002, available at
httpJ/canadagazette.gc.ca/partI/2002/20021026/pdf/gl-13643.pdf.
301. Martin & Lamoureux, supra note 280.
302. See id. The data came from a website maintained at the University of
California Hastings College of Law by the Center for Gender and Refugee
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Other refugee scholars contest this conclusion. Professor
Karen Musalo, the Director of the Center for Gender and
Refugee Studies, disagreed with these findings. 3  In her
view, the data Professor Martin based his report upon is not
representative of all gender-based claims because it is skewed
toward successful cases, as unsuccessful cases often go
unreported. °4
It is debatable whether Canada will violate its
international legal obligations by returning a refugee
applicant with a gender-based claim to the United States.
Under the minimum legal requirements criteria, Canada may
not send a refugee applicant back to the United States if
Canada considers there to be one permissible interpretation
of the Refugee Convention for the treatment of domestic
violence cases and the United States fails to adhere to that
interpretation. Canada follows the UNHCR guidelines 305 and
considered the United States' failure to do so a problem. 6
However, the United States does not outright reject the
UNHCR guidelines, and has recognized domestic violence as
the basis of a refugee claim.0 7 Moreover, after Professor
Martin's study, Canada declared that the two countries have
substantially similar laws on the subject of gender-based
claims. 8 Canada committed to reviewing the STCA after one
year, with particular focus on gender claims.30 9  At a
minimum, Canada should ensure that U.S. treatment of
gender-based claims is satisfactory.
c. Expedited Removal
This article has examined whether the United States'
interpretation of the Refugee Convention results in an
impermissible failure to meet the minimum legal
requirements criteria. In this section, this article will
Studies. Id.
303. 6 MONTH REPORT, supra note 275, at 9 n.26.
304. Id.
305. Arnett, supra note 282, at 965.
306. See 6 MONTH REPORT, supra note 275, at 10.
307. Martin & Lamoureux, supra note 280.
308. Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations, Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, 138 CAN. GAZETTE 1618,
Nov. 3, 2004, available at
httpJ/canadagazette.gc.ca/partI/2004/20041103/pdf/g2-13822.pdf.
309. Id.
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address whether the processes the United States employs to
assess refugee claims is so unfair as to violate the minimum
legal requirements criteria.
Expedited removal is utilized when people arrive in the
United States without travel documents-passport or visa-
or with fraudulent documents. 1 ° Under expedited removal, a
person arriving in the United States is returned to his or her
home country without a hearing unless he or she expresses a
fear of persecution, or requests asylum.3 11 The decision to
return a traveler to his or her home country is made by an
immigration officer.3 12  The expedited removal process
therefore presents the possibility of a refugee applicant not
receiving a full hearing before an officer trained to assess
refugee status.
According to the STCA, those returned to the United
States from Canada are entitled to a "refugee status claim
examined by and in accordance with the refugee status
determination system of the United States."313 Furthermore,
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) considers
those sent back from Canada under the STCA as having
never left the United States.1 4 Thus, according to DHS, such
persons should not be subject to expedited removal, with rare
exceptions, given that they are considered to be in the United
States.15 Presumably, this means that a person returned to
310. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (2005).
311. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Additionally, those who claim lawful status in the
United States are entitled to more procedures. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(C).
312. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
313. See Safe Third Country Agreement, supra note 12, at art. 5(b)(ii); see
also Implementation of the Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Canada Regarding Asylum Claims
Made in Transit and at Land Border Ports-of-Entry; Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg.
69,480, 69,484 (2004) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 212, 235) [hereinafter
Implementation Regulations].
314. The Department of Homeland Security expressed this view in the
supplementary information included in the implementing regulations to the
STCA. See Implementation Regulations, supra note 313.
315. Id. This follows from the fact that expedited removal applies only to
arriving aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2005). The Department of
Homeland Security takes the position that those returned to the United States
from Canada under this agreement are not arriving aliens. Implementation
Regulations, supra note 313, at 69,484. The supplementary notes offer an
example of an exceptional case, a person granted parole. Id. Parole means a
person is allowed into the country but is legally not admitted, see 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(13)(B), so they stay in a state of arriving in the United States no matter
how long they actually remain in the United States. See, e.g., Altamirano v.
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the United States from Canada should receive a full hearing
before an immigration judge to assess his or her claim to
refugee status.
However, there is strong anecdotal evidence that the
expedited removal process is being applied to refugee
applicants returned to the United States. First, while DHS
took the position that few, if any, refugee applicants should
be subject to expedited removal, the United States refused to
exclude refugee applicants returned under the STCA from the
expedited removal provisions. 16 Second, starting on January
30, 2006, the United States began to apply the expedited
removal provisions to the U.S.-Canadian border. 317  As a
result, anyone within one hundred miles of the border who
cannot show presence in the United States for more than
fourteen days will be subject to expedited removal."1 Third,
organizations monitoring the implementation of the STCA
report detention of refugee applicants sent back to the United
States. 19  Detention is part of the expedited removal
process, 32° suggesting that those refugee applicants may have
been subject to the expedited removal process.3 21 Lastly, the
United States applies the expedited removal process to those
refugee applicants who are attempting to enter the United
States from Canada who the United States may send back to
Canada.322 It is likely, therefore, that the United States is
Gonzales, 427 F.3d 586, 590-91 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that parole status was
not "admission" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13), and a Mexican parolee was
considered an applicant for admission upon reentry into the United States). If a
person's parole period expires (the United States places time limits on how long
parole lasts) before they are sent back to the United States by Canada, they are
subject to expedited removal. Implementation Regulations, supra note 313, at
69,484.
316. Implementation Regulations, supra note 313, at 69,484.
317. See Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Department of Homeland
Security Streamlines Removal Process Along Entire U.S. Border (Jan. 30, 2006),
at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release-0845.shtm.
318. Id.
319. BORDERING ON FAILURE, supra note 84, at 20.
320. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
321. Detention of refugee applicants does not definitively prove they were
subject to the expedited removal process. U.S. law allows for the detention of
any alien pending a decision as to whether he or she should be removed from
the United States. See id. § 1226(a).
322. UNHCR, MONITORING REPORT: CANADA-UNITED STATES "SAFE THIRD
COUNTRY" AGREEMENT 44 (2006), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/home/PROTECTION/455b2cca4.pdf.
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applying the expedited removal process to refugee applicants
returned to the United States under the STCA.
The issue under the minimum legal requirements criteria
is whether expedited removal is a sufficiently fair process for
assessing refugee status. The UNHCR established guidelines
identifying core elements of fair and efficient asylum
processes. 23  The UNHCR's minimum standards for
accelerated asylum procedures require three safeguards. 24
First, an applicant should have a complete interview with a
qualified official.325 Second, an authority competent to assess
refugee status should decide whether a claim is manifestly
unfounded or abusive. 26 Third, an unsuccessful applicant
should have the opportunity to have a negative determination
of refugee status reviewed before being deported. 27 These
procedures may be used in cases in which a refugee claim is
manifestly unfounded under the Refugee Convention or is
clearly fraudulent. 28
The United States' expedited removal process provides an
opportunity for an individual to request protection. This
opportunity arises at the initial stage of inspection in which
an immigration inspector decides that someone may not be
admissible into the United States.3 29 The applicant is then
placed in secondary inspection, in which the inspector must
inform the individual that if he or she has fears of being
returned home, U.S. law provides certain protections from
persecution.3  In addition, the inspector should ask
questions to assess the applicant's eligibility for refugee
323. UNHCR, Global Consultations on Int'l Prot., 2d Meeting, Asylum
Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), 25-33, U.N. Doc.
EC/GC/01/12 (May 31, 2001) [hereinafter Asylum Processes], available at
http://www.unhcr.orgcgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3b389254a.
324. Id. 32. For a discussion of UNHCR standards, see David A. Martin,
Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration Laws, 40 VA. J.
INT'L L. 673, 692-94 (2000).
325. Asylum Processes, supra note 323, 32.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. 27.
329. Karen Musalo et al., The Expedited Removal Process: Report on the First
Three Years of Implementation of Expedited Removal, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5 (2001).
330. Id.
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status.33' If the individual expresses fear of being returned to
his or her country or requests asylum,332 the person has a
personal interview with a U.S. immigration official trained in
asylum law.333 The individual is given what U.S. law calls a
"credible fear hearing" to determine if there is a significant
possibility that the applicant could establish eligibility for
protection.334 Detention is mandatory pending the credible
fear hearing.3  If the hearing results in a negative
determination the applicant may request de novo review by
an immigration judge. 36 United States law also allows U.S.
immigration officials to reconsider their decision to deny a
person's claim of credible fear even after an immigration
judge upholds an initial negative determination. 337 A positive
finding of credible fear entitles the refugee applicant to a full
hearing before an immigration judge.338
While it appears that expedited removal meets the
UNHCR standards, fairness is not simply established by the
procedures that exist on paper. Scholarship criticizing
expedited removal has focused on deficiencies in these
procedures that lead to an increased likelihood of errors.339
Professors Phil Schrag and Michele Pistone, in a thorough
analysis, point first to deficiencies in the secondary inspection
stage when an immigration official determines whether an
individual may be eligible to receive protection.340 This stage
is critical since there is no judicial review of the inspector's
decision.34' Shortcomings that may occur at this stage
include inadequate interpreters and physical conditions
during secondary inspections.342 Interpreters are not required
in all cases and are not required to have professional
331. 1 U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM [JSCIRF], REPORT ON
ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 21
(2005).
332. Musalo et al., supra note 329, at 5-6.
333. Id. at 6.
334. Id. at 7.
335. Id. at 8.
336. Id. at 7.
337. Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved
But Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 48 (2001).
338. Musalo et al., supra note 329, at 7.
339. Pistone & Schrag, supra note 337, at 32-36.
340. Id. at 38.
341. Id. at 40.
342. Id. at 53-65.
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competency.343  During secondary inspection, when an
applicant is expected to express fear of return, the conditions
do not facilitate trust because the interviews are semi-
private, and the applicant is often restrained and treated
with hostility.344
Deficiencies also exist when a non-citizen is interviewed
to determine whether they have a credible fear of
persecution. 45  Professors Pistone and Schrag identified
problems such as the use of telephonic interpretation, and the
limited role of counsel if there is a negative determination of
credible fear.346 Telephonic interviews increase the likelihood
of translation errors since body language and demeanor are
not available to the translator.347 Legal counsel is permitted
to be present during credible fear interviews, but immigration
judges may forbid their presence during the review of a
negative credibility finding.348 Professors Pistone and Schrag
also observed that detention throughout the credible fear
process hampers the ability of applicants to obtain counsel
and persevere in their refugee protection claims.349
Several recent studies of the expedited removal process
have produced a variety of statistics on the expedited removal
process.350 This data provides detail on the actual functioning
of the expedited removal procedures which allows for an
assessment of the fairness of the process. The most recent
study, conducted by the U.S. Commission for International
Religious Freedom (USCIRF),351 reveals that the expedited
removal procedures are not consistently followed at the
secondary inspection stage. The USCIRF study states that in
the secondary inspections it observed, over half of the
individuals were not informed of their right to request
refugee status. 52  Fifteen percent of individuals who
343. Id. at 54-55.
344. Id. 61-63.
345. Pistone & Schrag, supra note 337, at 40-42.
346. Id. at 41-42.
347. Id. at 66-68.
348. Id. at 70.
349. See id. at 61-65, 70-73.
350. See Musalo et al., supra note 329; see also 1 USCIRF, supra note 331;
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OPPORTUNITIES EXIST To IMPROVE THE
EXPEDITED REMOVAL PROCESS, Pub. No. GAO/GGD-00-176 (2000).
351. USCIRF is a bipartisan federal agency created by Congress. 1 USCIRF,
supra note 331, at 1.
352. Id. at 6.
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expressed fear of returning were not given credible fear
interviews. 3  In addition, interviews with refugee applicants
revealed that a number of persons received a credible fear
hearing only after attempting to enter the United States
several times. 54 A recent scholarly analysis of the USCIRF
report asserts that the failure to follow the proper procedures
during secondary inspection has resulted in tens of thousands
being improperly denied a refugee status hearing and
thousands of bona fide refugees being denied protection.355
Data is also available on the credible fear hearings. The
USCRIF study, as well as a preceding study, revealed that
the vast majority of those who received a credible fear
hearing were found to have a credible fear and were granted
full hearing before an immigration judge. 56  However,
USCIRF also examined immigration judges' decisions
subsequent to credible fear hearings. In forty percent of the
cases in which refugee status was denied, the immigration
judge cited inconsistencies between the applicant's credible
fear interview and the testimony given in the hearing before
the judge.5 7 The USCIRF study concluded that this was very
troubling because it found that the records of the credible fear
interview were often inaccurate and incomplete.5 The
credible fear hearing is not meant to be an in-depth
interview, and in nearly three-quarters of the cases, the
applicant did not review the transcript even though the
asylum officer indicated that the applicant had done so.39
Yet, immigration judges in nearly a quarter of the cases cited
an applicant's additional testimony in the subsequent hearing
as a basis for denying the refugee claim.3 6 ° Therefore, in
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Michele Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to Be Broken: How
the Process of Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers 196 (Villanova Univ.
Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 49, 2006).
356. The USCIRF found that ninety percent of those who went through a
credible fear hearing were found to have a credible fear. 1 USCIRF, supra note
331, at 57. Another study, headed by Professor Musalo, found that the credible
fear approval rate was eighty-eight percent for fiscal years 1997-1999, with a
four percent denial rate. Musalo et al., supra note 329, at 59. All other cases
were withdrawn or otherwise terminated. Id.
357. 1 USCIRF, supra note 331, at 7.
358. Id. at 57.
359. Id.
360. Id.
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many cases, immigration judges based their decisions on
incomplete credible fear transcripts that the applicant had
not reviewed for errors.
Clearly, there are serious problems with the expedited
removal process. Yet in assessing this process under the
minimum legal requirements criteria, it is unclear how much
of an impact the expedited removal process is having on those
returned under the STCA. A recent scholarly analysis
concluded that thousands of improper refoulements occurred
due to failures in the secondary inspections process. 6'
However, those returned under the STCA should not be
subjected to secondary inspection. They should receive
credible fear hearings because it is clear they fear
persecution.3 62 However, with the USCIRF study reporting a
fifteen percent failure rate in referring applicants to credible
fear hearings,363 there is some risk of improper refoulement
occurring to refugee applicants returned to the United States
under the STCA.
In addition, refugee applicants returned to the United
States under the STCA also face the risk of an inaccurate
credible fear hearing transcript impacting subsequent
proceedings before an immigration judge. However, the
USCIRF study did not attempt to identify whether
immigration judges made erroneous decisions based upon
inaccurate credible fear transcripts.3 6 This leads to an
unsatisfactory conclusion that the expedited removal process
creates a risk of non-refoulement, but the data is insufficient
to assess whether actual violations occurred, proving that the
system is so unfair as to violate the minimum legal
requirements criteria. As will be explored below, however,
the detention aspect of expedited removal makes this process
a clear violation of the minimum legal requirements
criteria. 65
361. See Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 355.
362. See 1 USCIRF, supra note 331, at 22 (stating that a hearing is held
within 48 hours, during which the asylum officer determines whether the fear
expressed by the alien is "credible").
363. Id. at 6.
364. Id. at 5.
365. See infra Part VI.B.1.
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d. Evidence of Systemic Unfairness
Along with the expedited removal process, there are
other features of the U.S. refugee protection system that
arguably are so unfair that they make the United States
unsafe. Unlike expedited removal, however, the features
examined below suggest that the entire system is unsafe for
any refugee applicant.
i. Lack of Publicly Financed Representation
United States law provides refugee applicants with the
privilege of obtaining an attorney at the refugee applicant's
expense. 66 However, this privilege arises only in the event
that a refugee applicant is placed in removal proceedings. 67
There is no duty on the part of the U.S. government to
provide an attorney.3 68 The U.S. government has a long and
troubling history of attempting to prevent refugee applicants
from retaining attorneys, particularly for those applicants in
detention. 6 9  This practice eventually led to litigation that
established that refugee applicants have the privilege of,
representation free from governmental interference.
The U.S. government maintains statistics on the
percentage of aliens in removal proceedings who are
represented. 7' Using these statistics, one scholarly analysis
reveals that two-thirds of all refugee applicants were
represented in removal proceedings from 1999 to 2000.372
366. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006).
367. Id. U.S. immigration law replaced the word "deportation" with
"removal" in 1996. Id. The privilege of an attorney arises only in removal
proceedings before an immigration judge. See 1 USCIRF, supra note 331, at 59.
Thus, in expedited removal, the refugee applicant usually faces the initial
interview and credible fear hearing without the benefit of an attorney. See id.
at 21, 45 ("Aliens seeking admission are not entitled to counsel, even at their
own expense, in primary or secondary inspection, unless they become subject to
a criminal investigation."). A detained alien in expedited removal may consult
with someone of their choosing. See id. at 22, 45.
368. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A).
369. See Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation For Detained
Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647, 1663-75
(1997).
370. Id. at 1675-78.
371. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review,
http://www.usdoj.gov/05publications/05_3.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2007)
(providing links to U.S. Department of Justice annual reports).
372. See Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum
Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 743 (2002).
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However, rates of representation varied widely based on
geography and national group. 3  A more recent study of all
asylum cases decided by immigration judges from 1994 to
2005 demonstrates that eighty-two percent of refugee
applicants were represented. 4  However, this study only
included cases that were heard by immigration judges. 7 s
Nearly half of all claims are withdrawn, abandoned or
otherwise resolved, 76 so the representation rate may be much
lower.
Canada, on the other hand, provides legal assistance to
refugee applicants through a province-based system. 7  The
availability of legal aid varies from province to province. 7 s
Some provinces have been accused of failing to provide legal
representation, particularly to detained asylum seekers. 79
One report regarding this system asserts that it is practically
impossible for applicants to find representation because few
attorneys are "willing to take on a detention case on a legal
aid certificate and travel to the detention centre or jail."38 °
Studies comparing represented and unrepresented
refugee applicants in the United States demonstrate that
being represented by an attorney greatly increases an
373. Id. at 742-43.
374. See TRAC Immigration, Immigration Judges,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2007). The
Transactional Records Clearinghouse (TRAC), a data clearinghouse at Syracuse
University, reviewed all recorded cases in which judges decided asylum cases
from 1994 until early 2005. Of the 297,240 cases reviewed, 245,982 applicants
had representation. Id.
375. Id.
376. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FY 2005 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at K4 (2005).
377. Clark, supra note 66, at 218.
378. Id. at 222. For example, in the Province of New Brunswick, there is no
legal aid available, and in Quebec, there is some access to legal aid that is
supported by a government fee. Id.
379. Canadian Council for Refugees, Submission of the Canadian Council for
Refugees on the Occasion of the Visit to Canada of the U.N. Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, June 8, 2005, http://www.web.net/-ccr/WGAD.HTM (last
visited Mar. 8, 2007); see also Clark, supra note 66, at 222-23.
380. CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES, REFUGEES AND NON-CITIZENS IN
CANADA: KEY CONCERNS REGARDING CANADA'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (CCPR), SUBMISSION TO HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 8 (2005),
httpJ/www.kairoscanada.org/e/refugees/detention/CCRSubmissionUNHRCtte
e_Sept05.pdf.
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applicant's chances of success.3 l However, these studies lack
information about the merits of the underlying claims.32 It is
impossible to assess how many of the unsuccessful claims of
unrepresented refugee applicants would have proven
meritorious with the benefit of an attorney. While some of
these claims may have been successful, it is reasonable to
assume that some would still fail and that an applicant's
meritless claim was, in fact, the reason for the applicant's
lack of representation.
Under the minimum legal requirements criteria, it is
arguable whether the absence of publicly financed
representation means the U.S. system is so unfair as to make
it unsafe. On the one hand, legal representation greatly
impacts the outcomes of cases, and statistics reveal that
many applicants do not receive legal representation.3 It is
reasonable to assume that the United States has denied
legitimate refugee claims as a result.
Arguments to the contrary can be made, however. The
UNHCR does not mandate free legal aid, but only requires
that refugee applicants should have access to it if it exists.3s
Further, the UNHCR recommends that refugee applicants
receive advice and guidance at all stages of the refugee
determination process, and have access to legal counsel.8 5
Both the United States and Canada have problems with
geographic variation in representation rates and difficulties
with refugee applicants receiving legal assistance. 386 It is
381. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW: U.S. DETENTION OF
ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE ERA OF HOMELAND SECURITY 39 (2004). This report
referenced a study done by Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of
International Migration, which revealed that a represented asylum seeker in
the United States is up to six times more likely to be granted asylum. See id. at
39. A study of asylum seekers in expedited removal proceedings by the USCIRF
revealed that asylum seekers without counsel had a two percent chance of being
granted asylum as compared to the twenty-five percent success rate with
representation. Id. at 4, 56.
382. Both studies simply compare success rates of unrepresented applicants
with the success rates of represented applicants. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST, supra note 381, at 39; 1 USCIRF, supra note 331, at 7, 34, 59. The
USCIRF specifically stated that it did not determine whether the correct result
occurred in the cases it examined. 1 USCIRF, supra note 331, at 5.
383. See supra Part VI.A.2.d.i.
384. 1 USCIRF, supra note 331, at 45 (citing Asylum Processes, supra note
323, 1 50).
385. Id.
386. Compare Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 372, at 742-43 (illustrating
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therefore difficult to assert that the United States is unsafe if
Canada has similar problems.
ii. Disparity in Approval Rates
A second concern regarding fairness in refugee
determination is the disparity in approval rates of refugee
claims between the United States and Canada. According to
a recent UNHCR study, the United States had a 34.9%
refugee recognition rate in 2002, while Canada had a 57.8%
recognition rate.8 7 It should be noted that Canada and the
United States are two of the most generous nations in the
world in terms of recognizing claims, as both surpassed the
2002 worldwide average refugee recognition rate of thirteen
percent.3 8 8 However, given that both countries adhere to the
Refugee Convention and apply the same international
definition of the term "refugee",3 9 it would be reasonable to
expect the difference in recognition rates between the United
States and Canada to be less drastic. Obviously, the issues
raised above play some role in the United States' lower
recognition rate, but there are many other factors in both
countries that also contribute to this significant disparity.
The aforementioned UNHCR study explored a number of
factors that have impacted the disparate refugee recognition
rates among the various countries. 9 ° Some of the variables
include the composition of the population seeking refugee
protection for each receiving country,39' the overall asylum
the problem in the United States), with Canadian Council for Refugees, supra
note 379 (illustrating the problem in Canada).
387. Kate, supra note 61, at 1.
388. Id. at 1. Canada and the United States rank number one and two
respectively in terms of refugee recognition. Id. However, the study went on to
include recognition rates on humanitarian grounds, in which an applicant
would not need to demonstrate that he or she is a refugee. Id. If these
recognition rates are included, Canada remains number one, but the United
States falls to third in the world. Id.
389. Canada ratified the Refugee Convention, while the United States
ratified the 1967 Protocol, making the Refugee Convention binding upon it. See
UNHCR, STATE PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL, 1-2,
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf.
390. Kate, supra note 387, at 2-3. The study noted that an asylum seeker in
Canada was 145 times more likely to be found to have experienced persecution
than the country with the lowest recognition rate, Greece. Id.
391. It should be noted that the United States and Canada share three
countries in common when looking at a list of the top ten countries of origin for
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392burden each country carries, political ideology,393 foreign
policy concerns,394 cultural views and economic conditions of
each receiving country.3 95 These factors may explain the
discrepancy in rates between the United States and Canada
to some extent. However, overall, the United States is
criticized for not maintaining international standards and
wrongfully denying refugee claims, and Canada is criticized
for being too generous with a system that produces false
positives, granting refugee status to those that should not
receive it. 3 9 6
Some scholars challenge the accuracy of data suggesting
a disparity in the recognition rate between the United States
and Canada. Professor Audrey Macklin, in a review of the
STCA, drew statistics from a non-governmental organization
that placed United States and Canada much closer in their
respective approval rates: fifty-eight percent for Canada
compared to forty-eight percent for the United States in
200 1.39  She asserts that Canada is not radically more
each. Compare Canadian Council for Refugees, Immigration and Refugee
Board, Refugee Protection Division, Statistics 2004, at
http'J/www.web.net/~ccr/irb2004stats.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2007), with
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2004:
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, at J1 (2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy04syb.pdf.
392. Kate, supra note 387, at 3.
393. Id.
394. See id. For a review of how U.S. foreign policy played a role in shaping
asylum policy, see generally Inna Nazarova, Comment, Alienating "Human"
from "Right": U.S. and U.K Non-Compliance with Asylum Obligations Under
International Human Rights Law, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1335, 1368-77 (2002).
See also Kevin R. Johnson, A "Hard Look" at the Executive Branch's Asylum
Decisions, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 279, 336-50 (1991).
395. Kate, supra note 387, at 3.
396. Randall Hansen et al., Report on the Workshop on Refugee and Asylum
Policy in Practice in Europe and North America, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 801, 805
(2000) (discussing the issue of Canada being too generous).
397. Macklin, supra note 9, at 412. Professor Macklin is a recognized refugee
law expert at the University of Toronto. Professor Macklin cited statistics from
the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants to support her contention that
there is only a ten percent difference. Id. The difference may be explained by
the fact that the United States has two different systems for processing
refugees, an affirmative process whereby a refugee applicant approaches the
U.S. government and asks for asylum. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 132, at 940.
A second process is called defensive asylum, in which a refugee applicant facing
deportation by an immigration judge asks for asylum as relief from deportation.
See id. Canada only has one process before an Immigration and Refugee Board.
See Parliamentary Information and Research Service, supra note 130. It may
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generous than the United States and that both countries have
become much less generous over the past few years, further
closing the gap.398  In addition, studies by other non-
governmental entities reveal no significant difference
between the United States and Canada.399 Professor Macklin
raised this point to challenge one of the justifications for the
STCA-that it improves security because the U.S. system is
tougher to exploit.400 However, these statistics also challenge
the alleged disparity in approval rates between the United
States and Canada. With no great disparity, it is difficult to
argue that the disparity reveals unfairness in the U.S.
refugee processing system.
Given this disagreement over recognition rates and
whether Canada is more generous, it is difficult to conclude
that the United States' system is so unfair as to violate the
minimum legal requirements criteria. The entire U.S. system
cannot be deemed non-compliant so as to make any return a
violation of Canada's obligations under the Refugee
Convention. However, this issue should encourage the
United States and Canada to examine the factors that affect
recognition rates to more precisely determine whether there
is a disparity between the two nations and, if so, how to
resolve it.
iii. Reversal of Administrative Claims by U.S. Courts
The growing frequency and vituperative tone with which
federal judges are reversing decisions by the immigration
courts evokes perhaps the greatest concern over the fairness
of the entire U.S. refugee protection system. The U.S. system
is structured such that the federal circuit courts of appeal are
the last bodies to which a refugee applicant can appeal as of
right after a hearing before the immigration judge and an
be that some estimates of U.S. approval rates include the affirmative process as
well as the defensive claims, whereas others only compare the defensive claims
because they are comparing approval rates by U.S. immigration courts with the
Canadian panel decisions.
398. Macklin, supra note 9, at 413.
399. See Road to Freedom?, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Oct. 2002, at 18, 18,
available at http'Jwww.newint.org/issue350/facts.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2007)
(asserting that Canada and the United States were practically the same in
terms of asylum approval rates).
400. See Macklin, supra note 9, at 412-13.
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appeal before the BIA.4°' Recently, federal courts have
experienced a dramatic upsurge in appeals from the BIA.40 2
There are two causes for this phenomenon. First, the U.S.
Department of Justice changed the BIA's procedures in 2002
to alleviate a large backlog of cases at the BIA.4 °3 The
streamlining of BIA procedures created a large volume of
decisions that could be appealed to the federal courts.4 °4
Second, the surge is the result of an increase in the appeal
rate, as a higher percentage of cases are being appealed to the
federal courts after the completion of administrative appeals.
405
Statistics on this phenomenon are remarkable.
Nationwide, the number of appeals to the federal courts from
the immigration system shot upward from approximately 270
per month in April 2002 to approximately 1100 per month in
April 2004.406 Several circuits in particular have been hit
hard, with appeal rates soaring 1000 percent in the same
time frame.40 7 Asylum cases comprise the majority of these
appeals and reversals.4 8
With this flood of cases, a number of federal judges have
expressed their exasperation at the quality of administrative
justice in the U.S immigration system.40 9 Most notably,
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner
stated in a recent opinion that "the adjudication of these
cases at the administrative level has fallen below the
401. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2005).
402. John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of
Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the
Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 3 (2005).
403. Id. at 3-4.
404. Id. The streamlining features included reducing the size of the BIA,
providing for a review by a single member of the BIA rather than the usual
panel of three judges, and allowing a single BIA member to affirm an
immigration judge without writing an opinion. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fact
Sheet: BIA Streamlining, Sept. 15, 2004, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining2004.pdf.
405. Palmer et al., supra note 402, at 4.
406. Id. at 44.
407. See e.g., Mark Hamblett, Circuit Struggles to Cope with Upsurge in
Asylum Appeals, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 25, 2005, at 1 (discussing the experience of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals); see also Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges'
Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at Al.
408. See Palmer et al., supra note 402, at 71-72 (stating that the Second and
Eleventh Circuits, specifically, are "dominated by asylum claims").
409. See Liptak, supra note 407.
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minimum standards of legal justice."41 ° Judge Posner further
drew attention to the problem by noting that forty percent of
immigration appeals were reversed by the Seventh Circuit in
2005.411
There are numerous reasons for the federal judges'
frustrations. Factual errors, legal errors in procedure and
substance, extreme bias, unsupported conclusions, and
unreadable opinions have been identified in various
decisions. 412 Some federal judges have gone so far as to name
individual immigration judges in their opinions for what they
consider to be inappropriate behavior toward refugee
applicants. 41 As a result of the mounting criticism from the
federal bench, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales ordered a
review of all immigration courts and the BIA to address those
"whose conduct can aptly be described as intemperate or even
abusive and whose work must improve."414 In August of 2006,
the Attorney General ordered the implementation of twenty-
two measures designed to improve the functioning of the
immigration court, including performance evaluations,
improved training for immigration judges and BIA members,
and alterations to the streamlining procedures to identify and
address improper decisions.415
Do these publicly acknowledged problems in the
adjudication of immigration cases indicate that the U.S.
system is so flawed as to be unfair to any refugee applicant
who is returned under the STCA? The answer to this
question turns partly on whether the federal judges'
complaints reflect a systemic problem or a problem with
410. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (referring not
only to asylum cases, but to all appeals of immigration cases on the merits).
411. Id. at 829.
412. Id. at 828 (citing to several Seventh Circuit decisions as well as
decisions from other circuits); see also Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d
104, 115 (2d Cir. 2005); Fiadjoe v. Attorney General, 411 F.3d 135, 154 (3d Cir.
2005); Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 292 (3d Cir. 2005); Lopez-Umanzor
v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005); Wang v. Attorney General, 423
F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005).
413. See Wang, 423 F.3d at 262.
414. Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. to Immigration Judges (Jan. 9,
2006) (on file with author).
415. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzales Outlines Reform for Immigration Courts & Board of Immigration
Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), available at
http'J/www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag-520.html.
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several specific immigration judges. Judge Posner cited a list
of cases demonstrating that other federal courts have
acknowledged the problem. 416  However, most of the cases
that Posner cited only identified a particular judge's
inappropriate or biased behavior rather than a systemic
problem.417 In response to federal judges' criticisms, the U.S.
government asserted that most immigration judges and the
BIA performed their duties properly, and that consequently
the government won most appeals in federal court, citing a
ninety percent success rate.418 While both Posner's forty
percent figure and the U.S. government's ninety percent
figure are more than anecdotal, neither provides a complete
picture of just how often federal courts overturn immigration
judges or the BIA.
A recent study explored why the rate of appeals rose
along with the number of appeals. One possible explanation
the study explored was an increase in the number of
erroneous decisions, which could lead more people to appeal
to the federal courts.41 9 Acknowledging the difficulty in
determining the error rate, the study used a sampling of BIA
decisions and federal cases, and calculated the reversal
rate.420 The reversal rate was calculated by the proportion of
appeals filed in a given month that were ultimately reversed,
vacated or remanded on the merits. 42' The authors concluded
that the reversal rate, while fluctuating widely in the past,
has not increased.422 Instead it has hovered between five and
fifteen percent between October 1994 and October 2002.423
However, the authors cautioned that the study did not
examine all BIA decisions, but only those appealed to federal
courts.424 Furthermore, the study covers only a short period
after the streamlining measures took effect in 2002.425 Thus,
416. See Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 829.
417. See id.
418. Liptak, supra note 407.
419. Palmer et al., supra note 402, at 54 (describing the ABA Commission's
proposal that the increase in appeal rate is due to the increase in summary
decisions, "which are more likely to be either erroneous, perceived as erroneous,
or simple unacceptable to the litigants").
420. Id. at 57.
421. Id. at 58.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 60.
424. Id. at 32.
425. Palmer et al., supra note 402, at 59. The authors of the study did not go
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it does not cover the period of time in which Judge Posner
made his observation about the reversal rate in the Seventh
Circuit.426
The lack of a more thorough study makes it impossible to
conclude that the rate of error is so high that the U.S. refugee
processing system is fundamentally flawed. Assuming a more
complete study can be done, a question that needs to be
addressed is, what constitutes an acceptable error rate. It
may be easier to conclude what constitutes an unacceptable
error rate; e.g. the forty percent reversal rate cited by Judge
Posner.427 However, that figure comes from a single federal
judge, sitting on a single court, regarding a single year.428
Clearly, a more thorough study is needed on the recent surge
of cases and whether the trend demonstrates that the
immigration courts and the BIA are making too many errors.
The reversals by federal judges may also be evidence that
the U.S. system is fair and meets international standards.
The federal courts are arguably performing their role by
identifying errors made by the administrative agencies and
using their opinions to send a message when the agencies
produce an unacceptable number of mistakes. 429 From this
perspective, Canada may assert that it is not complicit in a
violation of international law by the United States because
the U.S. system is regulating itself properly. However, the
argument could be made that these cases revealing bias and
error by immigration judges are the tip of the iceberg since
many cases are not appealed. While this counter-argument
has intuitive appeal, there is no data on which to base such a
conclusion.
All three issues-lack of counsel, disparity in approval
rates, federal courts overturning the BIA-highlight problems
with the U.S. refugee processing system. All three raise
concerns that a refugee applicant will be improperly refouled.
However, the evidence in all three cases is inconclusive with
beyond October 2002 in calculating the reversal rate because eighty percent of
the cases filed after October 2002 had not been finally adjudicated by the time
the study was conducted. See id. at 60.
426. Posner's forty percent reversal figure applied to appeals heard by the
Seventh Circuit in 2005. See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th
Cir. 2005).
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. See Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 653 (7th Cir. 2003).
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regard to how much of a problem exists. There is also a lack
of international benchmarks against which to measure the
U.S. system. Thus, these issues are best described as
arguable violations of the minimum legal requirements
criteria by the United States.
B. Threats to Other Refugee and Human Rights
An application of the minimum legal requirements
criteria to other rights protected by the Refugee Convention
and other human rights treaties reveals more problems with
Canada's participation in the STCA. These problems can
again be broken down into clear violations and those that are
debatable.
1. Clear Violations of the Minimum Legal Requirements:
Detention
As discussed above, the United States began using the
process of expedited removal in 2006.430 Detention is
mandatory under the expedited removal process until an
applicant demonstrates a credible fear of persecution. 431 This
policy applies along the U.S.-Canada border.432  As a
consequence, almost all refugee applicants facing expedited
removal will experience detention for some period of time.433
The number of refugee applicants detained is a small
percentage of the total number of refugee applicants in the
United States,434 and many applicants are eligible for
430. See supra Part VI.A.2.c.
431. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2005); see also id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
432. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., supra note 8.
433. Cory Fleming & Fritz Scheuren, Statistical Report on Detention, FY
2000-2003, at 338, in 2 USCIRF, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED
REMOVAL: EXPERT REPORTS, at 338 (2005), available at
http'//www.uscirf.gov/countries/global/asylum-refugees/2005/february/ERSRpt
VolII.pdf.
434. See Hansen et al., supra note 396, at 806. This is due to the fact that
most claims are raised by aliens who have already entered the United States
lawfully or are otherwise not subject to expedited removal. See id. In 2002,
there were 100,690 refugee applicants, 80,097 of whom filed affirmatively with
the government, meaning they had already entered the United States. See Bill
Frelick, US Detention of Asylum Seekers and Human Rights, MIGRATION POLY
INST., Mar. 1, 2005,
httpJ/www.migrationinformation.org/Featureprint.cfh?ID=296. Of the
100,690 applicants in 2002, only 18,450 were detained. Id.
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parole.435  However, a significant percentage of refugee
applicants subjected to expedited removal are detained for a
significant length of time.436 For example, in 2003, the
average length of detention for a refugee applicant in the
expedited removal process was longer than two months,437
and nearly half were detained for one to six months. 38 Some
remained in detention for the full period in which they were
in proceedings, which may last months or even years.439
There are other examples of refugee applicants facing
mandatory detention in the United States. For a brief period
in 2003, the United States stated that it would extend
mandatory detention to nationals of countries in which "al-
Qaeda, al-Qaeda sympathizers and other terrorists groups"
were known to have operated (mostly Middle Eastern and
Islamic countries)." ° Additionally, after September 11, 2001,
the United States announced it would detain all Haitians
attempting to enter the United States without documents,
regardless of their intent to request asylum." As a result of
expedited removal and these other mandatory detention
policies, tens of thousands of refugee applicants have been
435. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a)-(c). Parole decisions are not reviewable by any
court. Id. § 1226(e). There is no official regulation on granting parole. Refugee
applicants going through the expedited removal process are eligible for parole if:
(1) they establish that they have a credible fear of persecution; (2) there is no
question about their identity; (3) a U.S. citizen or other family members with
lawful presence in the United States are willing to house and support them
while their claim is pending; (4) they pose no danger to the United States; and
(5) they are not otherwise ineligible for asylum. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,
supra note 381, at 8.
436. Fleming & Scheuren, supra note 433, at 337. In fiscal year 2003, 2933 of
the 6005 refugee applicants referred for a credible fear hearing were detained
for thirty days or less (forty-nine percent), 1123 were detained for 30 to 90 days
(nineteen percent), 856 were detained for 90 to 180 days (fourteen percent), and
897 were detained for more than 180 days (fifteen percent). Id. The study
indicated that 196 completely avoided detention (three percent), but the authors
of the study believe this is an error and that in fact, all refugee applicants were
detained at some point. Id. at 329. A total of 160 remained in detention in
2005, when the USCIRF report was published. Id. at 337.
437. Id. at 330.
438. Id. at 337.
439. Id. at 332-33, 371-78.
440. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Operation Liberty
Shield (Mar. 17, 2003), at
http'//www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press-release_0115.shtm.
441. Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Refugee Protection in the U.S. Post-September
11, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 323,360-64 (2005).
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detained over the past several years.442
The United States gives several justifications for its
detention policy. The first is a high absconding rate for aliens
who are not detained." 3 In a 2003 strategic plan, the DHS
asserted that only fifteen percent of non-detained aliens
appeared for their immigration proceedings, leaving eighty-
five percent to remain unlawfully in the United States."8
Second, the United States asserts a need to protect the public
from aliens who may commit crimes or otherwise pose
security threats to the United States." 5 As noted above, in
the wake of September 11, 2001, national security grounds
justified the mandatory detention of refugee applicants from
particular countries." Third, detention is meant to deter
unlawful entry into the United States." 7
In a critique of these rationales, Professor Michele
Pistone asserts that the true reason for the broad detention
policy in the United States is the deterrence of undocumented
immigration." Professor Pistone's research demonstrates
that there is little effort in the United States to ensure that
the absconding and safety rationales govern choices regarding
the release of refugee applicants." 9  For example, huge
discrepancies exist in the rates of refugee applicants released
from detention in various parts of the United States,
demonstrating a geographic inconsistency in the application
of the rationales.5 °  Recent studies support this
observation. 451 Further, those charged with granting parole
to refugee applicants express little interest in discovering
whether their parole decisions result in a decreased
442. HuMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 381, at 7.
443. See Michele R. Pistone, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied, 12 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 197, 224 (1999).
444. IMMIGRATION AND CuSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., ENDGAME: OFFICE OF DETENTION AND REMOVAL STRATEGIC PLAN, 2003-
2012, at 2-6 (2003); see also Frelick, supra note 434. This figure is for all aliens
who are in removal proceedings, not just refugee applicants. Id.
445. Pistone, supra note 443, at 224.
446. See supra notes 440-42.
447. Pistone, supra note 443, at 224.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 224-31.
450. Id. at 228. The variance runs between a ninety-seven percent parole
rate in Harlingen, Texas, to a parole rate below four percent in Newark, New
Jersey. Frelick, supra note 434.
451. 1 USCIRF, supra note 331, at 62.
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absconding rate.452
Additionally, Professor Pistone's research demonstrates
that the availability of bed space in detention facilities
frequently governs parole decisions rather than concerns
about the likelihood of absconding or public safety.45 3 If a
detention facility has bed space, refugee applicants are denied
parole and remain incarcerated, regardless of the fact that
they present no danger and have a great likelihood of
appearing in immigration court.45 4 This de facto policy
supports Professor Pistone's conclusion that deterrence lies at
the heart of U.S. detention policy because filling all available
detention beds keeps as many aliens detained as possible.455
Professor Pistone also points out that expedited removal
has greatly reduced the need for detention to deter
undocumented entry into the United States.456 Most persons
who arrive in the United States without documents are
immediately removed without a hearing.457 Thus, immediate
removal now serves as the primary deterrent against
traveling to the United States without valid documents.
Given that the people who avoid expedited removal are those
who demonstrate a credible fear of persecution, there is no
reason to use detention to deter them.458  Those with a
credible fear of persecution are people to whom to the United
States owes a duty to assess their refugee status.
The implementation of expedited removal also
undermines the absconding rationale for detention, even
though it does not actually guide detention policy. Professor
Pistone asserts that since those remaining in the United
452. Pistone, supra note 443, at 228-29. The term "parole" in the
immigration context refers to the decision to release an alien into the United
States pending a decision about whether he or she may be legally entitled to
enter. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2005).
453. Pistone, supra note 443, at 230-31.
454. Id. at 228-32.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 232. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Prior to 1996, anyone arriving in
the United States could request protection as a refugee. They would be
admitted into the United States and given work authorization while waiting for
months to years for their refugee claims to be adjudicated. Id. at 235. The U.S.
government began using detention in the 1980s to address an influx of refugee
applicants from the Caribbean. Id. at 227.
457. Pistone, supra note 443, at 233-34.
458. Id. at 237.
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States have a credible fear of persecution, they have a strong
incentive not to abscond, but instead to appear at the hearing
to determine their refugee status.459 Thus, again, there is
little reason to detain these refugee applicants.
This assertion is supported by a recent statistical
analysis that challenges the absconding rate asserted by the
U.S. government. A distinction between aliens who are in
proceedings-e.g., those with pending asylum and
withholding claims-and those with final removal orders
must be made. Once those two groups are separated, the
absconding rate drops dramatically. The USCIRF study on
expedited removal 46 ° determined that refugee applicants who
demonstrated a credible fear of persecution had an
absconding rate of only twenty-two percent.46' In response to
the USCIRF report, the U.S government subsequently
released figures indicating a thirty percent absconding rate.462
The U.S. government acknowledged that the higher figure of
eighty-five percent in the 2003 DHS strategic plan
463
represents those who have completed their cases and have an
order for removal issued against them.464 Some analysts
assert that the actual absconding rate for refugee applicants
may be even lower, around 5.7%.465 These statistics support
Professor Pistone's conclusion that the use of expedited
removal undercuts the absconding rationale for the detention
of refugee applicants who are in proceedings. Since those
who demonstrate a credible fear receive a hearing regarding
their refugee claim before an immigration judge, they are far
more likely to appear rather than abscond. Therefore, they
do not, as a general matter, need to be detained.
Finally, regarding the public safety rationale, Professor
Pistone noted the lack of statistical evidence that refugee
applicants posed a significant risk to the safety of U.S.
459. Id. at 238-39.
460. See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
461. See Fleming & Scheuren, supra note 433, at 379.
462. See Frelick, supra note 434.
463. See supra note 444 and accompanying text.
464. See Frelick, supra note 434.
465. See id. Bill Frelick of Amnesty International calculated this figure for
EOIR data. Id. However, he noted that his statistics are for all refugee
applicants, whereas the USCIRF study only included refugee applicants going
through expedited removal. Id.
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citizens.466 Further, there does not seem to be any interest in
assessing the risks an individual applicant poses. For
example, the U.S. policy of mandatory detention for aliens
from designated countries in which al-Qaeda operates 46 7 did
not require any evidence of a link between the refugee
applicant and a terrorist organization.46 The United States
officially ended the mandatory detention policy for such
aliens one month after it began.46 9 However, the mandatory
detention of Haitians470 continues, and many assert there is
an unofficial practice of mandatory detention for Muslims and
those from the Middle East.47'
Not only must the U.S. rationale for detention be
examined, but the conditions of detention must also be
explored. Many studies demonstrate the damaging effect
detention has on refugee applicants. 472  Refugee applicants
are often subjected to prison-like conditions, 473 and in a
significant number of cases, they are housed in state and local
jails.474  These conditions can exacerbate the trauma that a
refugee applicant already suffers from the persecution
endured in his or her own country.475 There is limited or no
mental health care available to refugee applicants in
detention to help them address these issues.47 6  As result,
refugee applicants may be handicapped in their ability to
present their claim for protection.477  The post-traumatic
stress of persecution can make it very difficult for refugee
applicants to even discuss the persecution, yet the burden
466. Pistone, supra note 443, at 239.
467. See supra note 440.
468. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 381, at 24.
469. Press Release, Human Rights First, Operation Liberty Shield Quietly
Terminated: Future Detained Asylum Seekers Still Unclear (May 15, 2003), at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2003_alerts/0515.htm.
470. See supra note 441.
471. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 381, at 25.
472. Id. at 33; see also Fleming & Scheuren, supra note 433, at 180-99;
Pistone, supra note 443, at 207-11.
473. 1 USCIRF, supra note 331, at 60.
474. Fleming & Scheuren, supra note 433, at 358. In fiscal year 2003, nearly
one-quarter of detained refugee applicants were held in state and local jails. Id.
475. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 381, at 34 (citing a 2003 report from
Physicians for Human Rights and the Bellevue/New York University Program
for Survivors of Torture that documents high levels of anxiety, depression and
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder among detained refugee applicants).
476. Id.
477. Pistone, supra note 443, at 215-25.
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rests on them to prove they fit the definition of a refugee.478
There are several other problems with the detention of
refugee applicants in the United States. As mentioned above,
the location of some detention facilities hampers refugee
applicants from obtaining and maintaining contact with
attorneys.4 79 Further, detention in state and local jails results
in refugee applicants being housed with potentially
dangerous people and treating applicants as though they
were criminals for requesting refugee protection.480 Lastly,
studies have documented the abuse of refugee applicants by
detention facility employees,4 1  triggering governmental
investigations of several facilities.4 2
An application of the minimum legal requirements to
U.S. detention policies and conditions reveals that the United
States clearly violates the Refugee Convention and the
ICCPR. Article 31 of the Refugee Convention forbids the
imposition of penalties on refugees who have come unlawfully
into the territory of a country that is party to the Refugee
Convention.4 3 Further, the Refugee Convention prohibits
restrictions on the physical movement of refugees, except
those restrictions necessary and only upon those whose status
is not yet regularized.4 "4 The UNHCR also issued guidelines
on the detention of asylum seekers which state that such
persons should not be detained absent exceptional reasons. 48 5
478. Id. at 217.
479. Pistone & Schrag, supra note 337, at 51-52.
480. 1 USCIRF, supra note 331, at 7. None of the refugee applicants
detained are criminals simply because they arrived in the United States
without documents as long as they presented themselves to an immigration
inspector at a place designated as a point of lawful entry into the United States.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006).
481. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & BELLEvuENYU PROGRAM FOR
SURVIVORS OF TORTURE, FROM PERSECUTION TO PRISON: THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF DETENTION FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS 105-28 (2003) [hereinafter
FROM PERSECUTION TO PRISON]; see also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 381,
at 36-37.
482. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 381, at 36.
483. Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 31.
484. Id. However, the Convention seems to imply that penalties are
permissible if refugees do not present themselves "without delay" and provide
and "show good cause" for their unlawful presence. See id.
485. UNHCR, Geneva, UNHCR Revised Guidelines on the Detention of
Asylum Seekers, at guidelines 2-3 (Feb. 1999) [hereinafter Detention
Guidelines]. Exceptional reasons include verifying identity, determining
whether there is a valid claim for refugee status, dealing with asylum seekers
deliberately trying to mislead authorities, or to protect national security or
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A refugee applicant's possession of fraudulent documents or a
failure to have travel documents should not, by itself, lead to
detention.48 6 Instead, the guidelines state that alternatives to
detention should be considered.4 7
Along with these limited justifications for detention, the
UNHCR guidelines propose procedural guarantees. 48 8 These
guarantees include informing the refugee applicant of the
reasons for detention, allowing him or her to challenge the
individual determination for detention, and giving him or her
the right to contact the local UNHCR office. 48 9 The Executive
Committee of the UNHCR issued conclusions to further
clarify the guidelines and identify when detention of a refugee
applicant becomes arbitrary, thereby violating the Refugee
Convention. 490  Arbitrary detention occurs when refugee
applicants are detained on the basis of broad criteria that do
not allow for individualized determinations of the need for
detention, when there is no administrative or judicial review,
or when detention occurs for disproportionate or extended
periods .491
Finally, the UNHCR guidelines address the conditions of
detention. The guidelines provide that conditions should be
humane, respecting the inherent dignity of refugee
applicants.492 There should be an initial screening to discover
torture and trauma victims. 493 These victims should not be
detained unless a qualified medical practitioner certifies that
they will not be adversely affected by detention. 494 Refugee
applicants should be accommodated separately from convicted
criminals if it they are housed in prisons and they should
order. Id. at guidelines 3(i)-(iv).
486. Id. at guideline 3(iii).
487. Id. at guideline 4.
488. Id. at guidelines 5(i)-(v).
489. Id. at guidelines 5(i), (iii), (v).
490. UNHCR, ExCom, Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: The
Framework, the Problem, and Recommended Practice, 25-26, U.N. Doc.
EC/49/SC/CRP.13 (June 4, 1999) [hereinafter Recommended Practice]. The
Executive Committee is composed of seventy member states that review and
approve the UNHCR's budget, discuss its programs, and assist the High
Commissioner in his or her responsibilities. See UNHCR, Executive
Committee, http://www.unhcr.org/excom.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
491. Recommended Practice, supra note 490, 25.
492. Detention Guidelines, supra note 485, at guideline 10.
493. Id. at guideline 10(i).
494. Id. at guideline 7.
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have the possibility of regular contact with family, friends
and legal counsel.495
In addition to the Refugee Convention, there are other
human rights treaties binding on Canada which prohibit
detention except under certain circumstances. The ICCPR,496
to which both the United States and Canada are party,497
forbids arbitrary arrest and detention.49 Further, both the
ICCPR and the Refugee Convention forbid discrimination on
the basis of race, religion or country of origin in the
application of their provisions. 499  The ICCPR applies to
everyone within the territory of a country that is a party to
the treaty. 00 Its provisions are also part of the minimum
legal requirements binding on Canada.5°' Thus, we must
examine the U.S. detention policy of refugee applicants in
light of both the Refugee Convention and the ICCPR.
First, detention in the United States under the expedited
removal process is mandatory rather than exceptional in
contravention of Article 31 of the Refugee Convention and the
UNHCR detention guidelines.0 2  Further, the expedited
removal process mandates detention for refugee applicants
possessing false documents or no documents even though the
detention guidelines state that this alone is an insufficient
reason.0 3 The United States' claim of a need for a brief
period of mandatory detention upon a refugee applicant's
arrival does not justify the fact that many refugee applicants
are detained for extended periods.0 4 The United States'
rationales for its mandatory detention policy, such as
preventing absconding or security, are unconnected to
detention or parole decisions.0 5 Therefore, the United States
fails to meet the standard of necessity established by the
495. Id. at guidelines 10(iii)-(iv).
496. ICCPR, supra note 113.
497. Id.
498. Id. at art. 9.
499. Id. at art. 26; Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at art. 3. The ICCPR
also forbids discrimination on several other grounds such as sex, political or
other opinion language, etc. ICCPR, supra note 113, at art. 26.
500. ICCPR, supra note 113, at art. 2.
501. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
502. See supra note 335.
503. See supra notes 486-87.
504. See supra notes 436-39 and accompanying text.
505. See supra notes 443-46.
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Refugee Convention to justify detention.0 6
Instead, the U.S. system detains refugee applicants on
the arbitrary basis of the availability of detention space. °7
The vast geographic disparities in detention rates and
inconsistent applications of parole policies demonstrate that
parole decisions are often not made based on individual
circumstances. 50  Further, there is no judicial review of the
decision to detain.50 9 As a result, a significant number of
refugee applicants in the expedited removal process face
prolonged detention in violation of the Refugee Convention,
the detention guidelines and the ICCPR.51 °
United States detention policies also run afoul of the
prohibition on discrimination in the Refugee Convention and
the ICCPR.511  When the United States mandated the
detention of refugee applicants from more than thirty
designated countries, the UNHCR declared that this policy
varied from international human rights norms and
standards.512 While the United States ended the policy
shortly after it began, mandatory detention still applies to
Haitians,513 which clearly constitutes discrimination on the
basis of nationality.
Lastly, some aspects of detention conditions in the
United States constitute clear violations of international
standards established by the UNHCR. The expedited
removal process's mandatory detention policy does not have
an exception for those suffering from trauma or torture. 14
And while the practice of detaining refugee applicants in
prison is not absolutely forbidden, 515 refugee applicants
should not be commingled with regular criminals. 516 One
506. See Refugee fonvention, supra note 27, at art. 31(2) ("The Contracting
States shall not apply... restrictions other than those which are necessary...
507. See supra text accompanying note 453.
508. See supra notes 298-99.
509. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2005).
510. See, e.g., supra notes 436-39 and accompanying text.
511. See supra notes 100, 499.
512. See UNHCR Concerned About US Detention of Asylum Seekers, UNHCR
NEWS, Mar. 21, 2003, at http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/3e7b42547.html.
513. See supra note 441.
514. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
515. Detention Guidelines, supra note 485, at guideline 10(iii).
516. Id.
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study found a violation of this detention guideline.517 With
the large number of facilities used to house refugee
applicants,518 there are reasons to be concerned that there is
widespread commingling. These are clear violation of
UNHCR guidelines.
Other aspects of detention conditions raise arguable
violations of international standards. The studies cited above
document numerous cases of inhumane treatment of refugee
applicants despite the U.S. government's responses to claims
of pervasive problems.1 9  It is unclear whether these
incidents reveal a systemic problem large enough to declare
the entire U.S. refugee processing system to be in violation of
international standards. The studies on detention suggest
that inhumane treatment is not a widespread problem.52 °
Likewise, detention, which effectively prevents applicants
from accessing attorneys, raises concerns but the scope of the
problem is unclear based on current data.
Given the clear violations of international standards by
the United States, Canada may not send a refugee applicant
back to the United States if he or she would face detention as
part of the expedited removal process. It may seem odd that
this article identifies detention under expedited removal as a
clear violation of the minimum legal requirements criteria,
but concludes that other parts of the expedited removal
process are arguable, as opposed to clear, violations.12' This
is because the international standards concerning detention
are more specific and the United States' failure to abide by
them is more obvious. The international standards
concerning fair refugee determination processes are more
general, and the evidence on U.S. practices reveals a risk of
erroneous refoulement, but no data documents actual
violations. 22 Therefore, it is not possible to identify the entire
expedited removal process as a clear violation of the
minimum legal requirements criteria; only the detention
provisions that are part of that process.
517. FROM PERSECUTION TO PRISON, supra note 481, at 106.
518. Fleming & Scheuren, supra note 433, at 359-66.
519. FROM PERSECUTION TO PRISON, supra note 481, at 105-28.
520. Id. at 106. This study indicated that seventy-six percent of detained
refugee applicants reported found their treatment to be neutral or good. Id.
521. See supra Part VI.A.2.
522. See Asylum Processes, supra note 323.
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2. Arguable Violations of the Minimum Legal
Requirements: Basic Human Needs
The return of a refugee applicant to the United States
under the STCA implicates the provision of basic needs to
refugee applicants, including housing, medical attention and
food. The question which arises is whether Canada has an
obligation under the minimum legal requirements criteria to
provide such basic material support to refugee applicants. As
this section will show, Canada arguably has this obligation
and is therefore complicit in a violation by the United States.
Since 1996, refugee applicants in the United States have
been barred from receiving federal public assistance.523 They
are not able to receive state benefits, either. 524 In addition,
refugee applicants are not permitted to work for the first six
months that their applications are pending.5 25 They must
instead rely upon the generosity of relatives, friends and
nongovernmental organizations, and are effectively treated as
undocumented aliens. 26 If refugee status is granted, welfare
benefits and work authorization become available. 27
These restrictions on public support and work
authorization are in place to curb what the U.S. government
perceived to be the abuse of the refugee processing system.528
Initially, the U.S. Department of Justice, and subsequently,
the U.S. Congress, changed the laws on granting work
authorization in response to the perception that the process
was rife with frivolous refugee claims filed only to obtain
work authorization.529  By denying the applicant the
opportunity to work for six months, and then gearing the
administrative system to produce a decision on a refugee
application in six months, Congress hoped to eliminate work
authorization or the receipt of public benefits as an incentive
for filing a refugee application.53 °  However, the average
523. See Fredriksson, supra note 67, at 760.
524. Id. at 769.
525. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2) (2005).
526. Fredriksson, supra note 67, at 760, 769.
527. See Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at arts. 23-24 (describing the
benefits that Contracting States should make available to refugees);
Fredriksson, supra note 67, at 769.
528. LEGOMSKY, supra note 132, at 1110-11.
529. Id.
530. Id. The provisions on the consideration of asylum applications and work
authorization are located at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(1)-(7).
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refugee applicant must wait a year or more for the full
processing of an application claim, including appeals, and
must eat, clothe him or herself and attend to health care
needs in the meantime. 531 Even if a refugee applicant obtains
refugee status, his or her receipt of benefits is time-limited.
Successful applicants may receive public benefits for only
seven years, after which they are cut off regardless of need." 2
Canada utilizes a dramatically different system. Once an
alien is deemed eligible to apply for refugee protection, he or
she receives health insurance, access to education, and social
assistance.5 33  This support continues while a claim is
pending.534 If refugee protection is granted, public benefits
become available as they would for any Canadian citizen.535
Canada's system of providing for the basic needs of
refugee applicants seems to reflect the human rights
obligations she has undertaken in international treaties.
This obligation is not found, however, in the Refugee
Convention. The Refugee Convention states that refugees
have a right to employment authorization, housing, and
public support once refugee status has been determined. 36
Thus, the failure to grant benefits or work authorization prior
to deciding a claim is not a violation of the Refugee
Convention.
Canada is party to another international human rights
treaty that addresses basic human needs, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).537  The ICESCR protects economic and social
rights as well as the civil and political rights covered by the
531. Fredriksson, supra note 67, at 760.
532. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A) (2005); Fredriksson, supra note 67, at 762.
533. See asylumlaw.org, Canada: Step-by-Step Through the Process,
httpJ/www.asylumlaw.org/legaltools/index.cfm?category=59&countrylD=35
(last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
534. See Citizenship and Immigration Can., Advice for Newcomers,
http'J/ww.cic.gc.ca/englishlnewcomer/menu-advice.html (last visited Mar. 9,
2007) (providing links to information about, among other things, Canadian
programs, employment, language training, and housing).
535. Id.
536. Legomsky, supra note 28, at 652. The Refugee Convention gives such
benefits to refugees lawfully staying in the territory. Refugee Convention,
supra note 27, at arts. 17, 21, 23.
537. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
[ICESCRI, Dec. 16, 1966, 3 U.N.T.S. 993.
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ICCPR.535 To that end, countries which ratify the ICESCR
recognize a right to work, a right to social security, a right to
an adequate standard of living, including adequate food,
clothing, and enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health.539  These rights are to be
exercised without distinction to national or social origin and
extend to everyone, not just citizens.5 40  Thus, the ICESCR
creates a definite international obligation on the part of
Canada to provide for the basic needs of refugees and
immigrants.
However, the ICESCR declares that its provisions should
be implemented to the maximum extent of a country's
resources to ensure a progressive realization of its benefits.54'
This limiting language generates an ambiguity as to the
scope of obligations undertaken by Canada.5 42 It is unclear
whether Canada's positive legal obligations under the
ICESCR extend to those who are in the process of applying
for refugee status as well as those granted refugee status.
While the United States has not ratified the ICESCR, the
complicity principle prohibits Canada from returning refugee
applicants if the ICESCR includes an obligation to provide
basic support to refugee applicants.543 One could argue that
538. See id. at preamble.
539. Id. at arts. 6-7, 11-12.
540. Id. at arts. 2, 11.
541. Id. at art. 2(1). Professor Stephen Legomsky asserted that the
progressive nature of the ICESCR makes it a "thin reed" for asserting that the
return of an asylum seeker would violate rights to subsistence. See Legomsky,
supra note 28, at 652. However, his conclusion was made in the context of cases
in which the third country was a developing country struggling to support its
own citizens. Id. Since Canada and the United States are not developing
countries, it could be argued that the obligations under the ICESCR take on a
more definite quality. ICESCR, supra note 537, at art. 2(3).
542. The body established to monitor the ICESCR, the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), pursuant to the authority
granted to it by the U.N., issued general comments on the nature of the
obligations undertaken by parties to the ICESCR. UNHCR, Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [CESCRI, General Comment 3: The
Nature of States Parties Obligations (art. 2, para. 1 of the Covenant), U.N. Doc.
E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/94bdbaf59b43a424c12563ed0052b66
4?Opendocument. It declared that while the obligations are progressive in
nature, and there is flexibility in deciding appropriate means, state parties are
under a definite legal obligation to ensure full realization of economic, social
and cultural rights. Id. 9.
543. HATHAWAY, supra note 33, at 370-88.
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once Canada decides to give benefits to refugee applicants, it
has an obligation under the ICESCR to provide benefits to all
refugee applicants. Canada cannot avoid this obligation by
returning some applicants to the United States. The
difficulty is in finding support in international law to
substantiate such a claim. Thus, it is not a clear violation of
the minimum legal requirements criteria for Canada to
return a refugee applicant to the United States when the
refugee applicant will not receive work authorization or
public benefits while his or her refugee application is
pending.
VII. CHALLENGING THE STCA
The above analysis demonstrates that there are clear
ways in which Canada will violate its international legal
obligations through the complicity principle if it sends a
refugee applicant back to the United States under the STCA.
The increased burden of proof to obtain the protection of non-
refoulement, the exclusions from protections under criminal
and terrorism grounds, and mandatory detention are all clear
violations of the minimum legal requirements criteria.5"
Other provisions reviewed above, such as the treatment of
gender-based claims,545 the expedited removal process, 546 and
overall questions of fairness of the U.S. refugee processing
system 547 are arguably, though not clearly, violations. These
features collectively result in less protection for those seeking
refugee status. Lastly, there are other features of the U.S.
system which demonstrate a lack of concern for the well-being
of refugee applicants, such as the absence of material
support.
Canada was aware of these issues when it entered into
the STCA. Many organizations sent comments to the
Canadian government echoing many of these concerns prior
to the enactment of the agreement.54  Refugee advocates
544. See supra Part V.C (setting forth minimum legal requirements); see also
Macklin, supra note 9, at 425.
545. See supra Part VI.A.2.b.
546. See supra Part VI.A.2.c.
547. See supra Part VI.A.2.d.ii.
548. See Am. Immigration Lawyer's Ass'n [AILA], AILA's Canada Chapter
Comments on Safe Third Country Regulations, AILA InfoNet Doc. No.
02122641, Dec. 2002, at httpJ/www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=8063
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asserted that Canada needed to amend the STCA or exercise
its authority in promulgating regulations to exclude certain
groups from coverage under the STCA.549 Despite these
warnings, Canada did not do either of these things.550 This
leads to the question-what can be done to address the
concerns raised above about the STCA?
A. Domestic Remedies
A coalition of non-profit agencies brought a civil suit in a
domestic Canadian court on the one year anniversary of the
STCA's enactment. 551 The central contention of the agencies
is that the STCA is inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, principally Section 7,552 which protects
life, liberty and security and prohibits deprivation except "in
accordance with principles of fundamental fairness."553 This
argument is strengthened by a Canadian Supreme Court
decision recognizing that Section 7 applies to all humans
within Canada, including those seeking refugee protections.554
The plaintiffs are calling upon the Federal Court of Canada to
overturn the designation of United States as a safe third
country.555 The Federal Court agreed to hear the case in June
2006.556 Oral arguments were heard on February 5, 2007.o57
(providing testimony of Nan Berezowski and David H. Davis before the
Canadian House of Commons Standing on Immigration); Canadian Council for
Refugees, Comments to the Standing Committee on Citizenship and
Immigration on the Proposed Safe Third Country Regulations, Nov. 14, 2002, at
httpJ/www.web.net/-ccr/s3cregscommentsstandcomm.html.
549. See AILA, supra note 548; Canadian Council for Refugees, supra note
548.
550. Canada did recognize in its regulations that it cannot send an asylum
seeker back to the United States under the STCA if that person risked facing
the death penalty. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, supra note 75.
551. See Press Release, Canadian Council for Refugees, Groups Launch Legal
Challenge of Safe Third Country Agreement (Dec. 29, 2005), at
http://www.web.net/-ccr/release29dec05.html; see also Macklin, supra note 9, at
424.
552. Macklin, supra note 9, at 424.
553. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I,
7, Schedule B Constitution Act 1982, Ch. 11 (U.K.).
554. Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [19851 1 S.C.R. 177
(Can.); Macklin, supra note 9, at 424-25.
555. Singh, 1 S.C.R. 177; Macklin, supra note 9, at 425-26.
556. Nicholas Keung, Man Loses His Bid to Come to Canada, TORONTO STAR
(Can.), Aug. 31, 2006, at A19.
557. See Canadian Council for Refugees, Amnesty Int'l & Canadian Council
of Churches, Media Advisory: Court and Parliament to Hear Safe Third Country
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B. Regional Remedies
The STCA may also be challenged at the regional and
international levels. The regional and international human
rights protection regimes discussed above provide monitoring
and enforcement mechanisms to which Canada has made
itself accountable.558 As will be explored below, there are
important limitations on the use of these fora.
At the regional level, two mechanisms that monitor
human rights in the Americas are the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (Commission), and the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights.559 However, the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights depends upon the consent
of the parties before it can exercise its jurisdiction,56 ° and
neither Canada nor the United States currently appears
before it. 561
The Commission, on the other hand, is empowered to
examine whether a party is abiding by its duties as set forth
in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, 2 which was adopted at the time the OAS was
established in 1948.563 Comprised of seven experts, the
Commission can receive petitions from individuals and non-
governmental organizations asserting that a right under the
American regime has been violated. 64 The Commission
Challenge (Feb. 1, 2007), at http'/www.web.net/-ccr/advisoryfeb07.html.
558. LEGOMKSY, supra note 126, at 1110-11; see also Singh, 1 S.C.R. 177.
559. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 523-44.
560. American Convention, supra note 97, 1144 U.N.T.S. at art. 62.
561. The Inter-American Court for Human Rights came into existence with
the creation of the American Convention on Human Rights (American
Convention), the foundational treaty for the American human rights regime.
See American Convention, supra note 97, 1144 U.N.T.S. at arts. 52-73.
However, neither the United States nor Canada have ratified the American
Convention. See Office of Int'l Law, Org. of Am. States, Multilateral Treaties,
B-32: American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica,"
http'//www.oas.orgjuridico/english/sigs/b-32.html (providing a chart with
information about the American Convention, including ratification status).
Therefore, the Inter-American Court has no jurisdiction.
562. See Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at arts. 3, 4, 16, 22, 27.
563. Unlike the Inter-American Court, the Commission existed prior to the
establishment of the American Convention, and its monitoring and enforcement
responsibilities are not limited to the human rights contained in the American
Convention. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 342, 523; see also Inter-Am.
Comm'n on Human Rights [IACHR], What is the IACHR?,
http'//www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
564. Statute of the IACHR, O.A.S. Res. 447 (IX-0/79), at arts. 1-2 (Oct. 1979),
available at http'//www.cidh.org/Basicos/basicl5.htm; see also IACHR,
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determines the admissibility of the petition and then works
toward a friendly settlement of the dispute. 65 If a settlement
is not possible, the Commission will issue findings of fact and
declare whether or not a country party has violated its
obligations .56
Canada's return of refugee applicants to the United
States has already been the subject of a petition to the
Commission.6 7 Prior to the STCA taking effect, Canada
returned applicants to the United States out of
administrative convenience, claiming it did not have enough
officers to conduct refugee interviews.568 Refugee applicants
were temporarily returned to the United States with a letter
indicating the date and time to return for a refugee
determination interview,569 a policy referred to as a "direct
back."571 Until 2003, this policy required Canadian
immigration officials to obtain a promise from U.S.
immigration officials that the applicant would be permitted to
return to Canada for the appointment.5 7' When this
requirement was eliminated, a group of non-governmental
organizations submitted a petition to the Commission
asserting that the direct back policy violated two provisions of
the American Declaration. 572 First, Article XXVII establishes
that "every person has the right, in case of pursuit not
resulting from ordinary crimes, to seek and receive asylum in
a foreign territory, in accordance with the laws of each
country and with international agreements."573 Second, the
petition asserted that the direct back policy violated Article
Composition of the IACHR, http://www.cidh.oas.orgtpersonal.eng.htm (last
visited Mar. 9, 2007) (listing current Commission members).
565. American Convention, supra note 97, 1144 U.N.T.S. at art. 48.
566. Id. art. 50; see also IACHR, supra note 563.
567. For the contents of the petition, see Letter from Deborah Anker, Dir.,
Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinic, et al., to Santiago Canton, Executive
Sec'y for the IACHR (Mar. 31, 2004), available at
http://www.web.net/-ccr/IACHRpet.PDF [hereinafter Letter to Santiago
Canton].
568. Id. at 2.
569. Id. at 3.
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. Id. at 11. The petition was filed by the Canadian Council for Refugees,
Vermont Refugee Assistance, Amnesty International Canada, Freedom House
(Detroit, MI), Global Justice Center, Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinic,
and Harvard Law School Advocates for Human Rights. See id. at 1, 22-23.
573. American Declaration, supra note 118, at art. XXVII.
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XVII, the right to a fair trial, because the policy lacked an
appeal mechanism. 74
Canada modified its direct back policy on August 31,
2006, by restricting its use of the practice to exceptional
circumstances. 575  However, the petition filed in the case of
Canada's direct back policy serves as a good model for a claim
against Canada for refouling refugee applicants under the
STCA. The claims would be essentially the same as those
made in the petition regarding direct backs, namely, that
Canada is violating the right of refugee applicants to a
refugee determination hearing.7 6  As a consequence of
Canada failing to give refugee determination hearings,
refugee applicants are ultimately refouled by the United
States in violation of the Refugee Convention. Likewise, the
argument may be made that the right to a fair trial under the
American Declaration has been violated because there is no
opportunity to appeal a decision to a court. 77
A petition challenging the STCA would face significant
hurdles. Most importantly, the right to asylum protected by
the American Declaration is qualified. As noted above,
Article XXVII states that every person has the right to
asylum "in accordance with the laws of each country and with
international agreements." 79  The STCA, being part of
Canadian domestic law, qualifies the right to seek and receive
asylum in Canada.8 ° It would be difficult, therefore, for a
574. Letter to Santiago Canton, supra note 567, at 19-20.
575. See the Canadian Council for Refugees, Modified!: CBSA Stops "Direct
Backs," 1 CHRONICLE, at http://www.web.ca/ccr/chronicle6.html#directbacks
(last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
576. See Letter of Santiago Canton, supra note 568, at 1. Under the direct
back policy, the argument is that the asylum seeker was detained by the United
States and could not make it back to Canada for his or her refugee
determination hearing. See id. Instead, he or she was refouled by the United
States in violation of the American Convention and the Refugee Convention.
See id.
577. The Canadian procedural manual provides that a dispute regarding the
applicability of the STCA will be reviewed by a separate officer not involved in
the original interview of the refugee applicant. See CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION CAN., supra note 80, at 30. However, there is no appeal to a
Canadian court. See id.
578. See American Declaration, supra note 118.
579. Id. at art. XXVII.
580. The Commission, in a previous case, held that if a right is established in
international, but not domestic law, it would not be recognized as a right under
Article XVII of the American Declaration. See Haitian Centre for Human
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petition to effectively challenge the STCA in its entirety. The
Commission is unlikely to conclude that Canada has a
positive legal obligation to hold a refugee determination
hearing and to grant protection to all who come to its border.
However, it may conclude that some aspects of the U.S.
refugee processing system violate international law, and
forbid return in those limited cases.
The Inter-American Commission would only consider a
petition after the resolution of this matter before the
Canadian courts. Domestic remedies must be exhausted
before the Commission will find a petition admissible, or a
petition must explain why domestic remedies did not need to
be exhausted."8 ' The petition before the Commission on the
direct back policy attempts to convince the Commission that
domestic remedies do not need to be exhausted. 582 However,
with a suit on the STCA pending before the Federal Court of
Canada,8 3 the Commission will likely wait for the Canadian
courts to completely resolve all matters before deciding that a
petition on the SCTA is admissible.
C. International Remedies
International fora also exist to challenge the STCA.
These fora are established by the human rights treaties
ratified by Canada and the United States.8 4 These bodies are
not courts, but rather committees of experts elected by the
parties to a particular treaty.585 Each human rights treaty
establishes a committee to monitor compliance by means of
reviewing reports from member nations on their adherence to
Rights v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 51/96,
OEA/Ser.1./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. at 550, 151-57 (1997), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/1996/unitedstates5l-96.htm.
581. There are several instances when exhaustion of domestic remedies
should not be required: (1) when due process of law is not afforded by domestic
legislation; (2) when a party asserting human rights is not granted access to
domestic remedies; or (3) there is an unwarranted delay by the domestic legal
system in rendering final judgment. American Convention, supra note 97, 1144
U.N.T.S. at art. 46(2).
582. See Letter to Santiago Canton, supra note 567, at 12-16.
583. Maria Jimenez, Canada, U.S. pact on refugees flawed, lawyer says, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), Feb. 2, 2007, at A9.
584. See supra note 97.
585. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 491-515; see also OHCHR, Human
Rights Treaty Bodies: Monitoring the Core International Rights Treaties,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/treaty/index.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
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the treaty, and drafting comments on the content of the
treaty provisions to explain the obligations contained
therein. 58 6  Additionally, the committees may receive
individual communications from persons claiming a violation
of treaty obligations if a country that is party to the treaty
recognizes the committee's competence to do so.5 87  The
function of the committees in receiving communications is to
determine whether a violation of a treaty occurred.8 8 If a
violation of a treaty provision has occurred, the committee
will direct the offending country to remedy the violation.8 9
The ICCPR established the Human Rights Committee
(HRC) to monitor and assist countries in complying with their
obligations.5 90 The HRC, under an optional protocol to the
ICCPR, may receive communications from individuals and
groups asserting violations of rights protected by the
ICCPR.5 91 The HRC then brings the communication to the
attention of the country accused of the violation, which must
respond within six months with an answer, clarification or
statement of remedies offered.592 The HRC then gives its
observations on whether breaches were committed to the
country and the author of the communication and notifies the
parties of the appropriate action to take in order to remedy
any violations. 93
Decisions by the HRC have already impacted the
enforcement of the STCA. The Committee has already
adopted the principle that Canada may not be complicit in a
586. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 491-515.
587. Id.
588. Id.
589. Id.
590. The Human Rights Committee is a body of eighteen independent
experts elected by the countries that are party to the ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra
note 113, at art. 28. These experts do not represent individual countries, but
are selected for their expertise. Id.
591. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter
Optional Protocol], available at httpJ/www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/ccpr.pdf.
Canada ratified the Optional Protocol, making itself accountable to the
Committee. See OHCHR, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights New York, 16 December 1966,
httpY/www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/5.htm (providing chart with
information about the Optional Protocol, including ratification status). The
United States has not ratified the Optional Protocol. Id.
592. Id. at art. 4.
593. See id. at art. 5.
280 [Vol: 47
UNSAFE IN AMERICA
violation of the ICCPR by returning someone to the United
States.594 It adopted this view when it concluded that Canada
violated the ICCPR by extraditing a person to the United
States who faced execution through cyanide gas, a practice
which the Committee found to be cruel and inhumane
treatment. 595  Thus, in implementing the STCA, Canada's
regulations stated that a refugee applicant cannot be
returned to the United States if he or she would face the
death penalty in any form.59
The precise violation alleged in a communication to the
HRC would depend on the particular individual being
returned to the United States. However, provisions of the
ICCPR most likely to be cited include Article 9, which
prohibits arbitrary detention, 97 Article 26, which prohibits
discrimination, 98 Article 14, which protects equal access to
courts, 599 and perhaps Article 7, which prohibits torture. °
The HRC has further elucidated the scope and meaning of
these articles through general comments published by the
United Nations.6 ' The HRC issued a comment on the right of
persons to liberty and security, making it clear that the
prohibition on arbitrary detention applies to detention for
immigration purposes.6 02 Thus, a refugee applicant sent back
594. U.N. ICCPR, Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 470/1991,
6.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (Nov. 18, 1993), available at
http'//www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsfY(Symbol)/a44232495227la678025673000413d7
6?Opendocument.
595. U.N. ICCPR, Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 469/1991,
16.4, U.N. doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (Jan. 7, 1994), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/0c4df251fe2fbc24802567230056fc46?
Opendocument. The case concerned Mr. Charles Ng who faced trial and
execution in California. Id. The evidence presented to the committee
demonstrated that the way the state carried out the execution, by cyanide gas,
the prisoner would experience prolonged suffering. Id.
596. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, supra note 75, at 1621
(presenting section 159.6 of the Regulations Amending the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (June 11, 2002)).
597. ICCPR, supra note 113, at art. 9.
598. Id. at art. 26.
599. Id. at art. 14.
600. Id. at art. 7.
601. See, e.g., U.N. Int'l Human Rights Instruments [HRII, Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.7 (May 12, 2004), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586bldc7b4043c1256a450044f331ca12c3a
4ea8d6c53c1256d500056e56f/$FILE/G0441302.pdf.
602. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
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to the United States under the STCA who faces arbitrary
detention may be able to send a communication to the HRC
asserting a violation of the ICCPR. As with the Commission
in the American human rights protection system, the HRC
cannot consider a communication alleging a violation of
human rights unless all domestic remedies have been
exhausted by the victim and no other international body is
considering the matter. °3
Another international body to which a refugee applicant
may turn is the Committee against Torture (CAT
Committee), which was established by the Convention
Against Torture (CAT).604  The CAT Committee can also
receive individual communications and functions in a very
similar fashion to the HRC. 60 5 The core provisions of the CAT
are Article 1,606 which defines torture, and Article 3,607 which
contains the non-refoulement provisions. Refugee applicants
facing a return to the United States under the STCA may
therefore claim that they will not be able to apply for
protection from non-refoulement in the United States, and
that they will be returned to a country in which they will be
tortured as a result.
Canada may respond to such claims, however, by citing
provisions of U.S. law that provide additional protection to
those who may be tortured. The United States, after
ratifying the CAT, created deferral of removal, a limited
ground of protection for those who are barred from asylum
and withholding of removal. 08 If a barred refugee applicant
Rights [CESCR], General Comment No. 8: The Relationship Between Economic
Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. No.
E/C. 12/1997/8 (Dec. 12, 1997), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/974080d2db3ec66d8O2565c5003b2f5
7?Opendocument.
603. Optional Protocol, supra note 591, at art. 5. Thus, the HRC would also
wait for the Canadian courts to decide the pending case regarding the STCA
before considering a communication. See id.
604. See CAT, supra note 97, at art. 22. Article 22 provides that a state may
recognize the competence of the CAT committee to receive individual
communications, and Canada has done so. See UNHCHR, Status by Country,
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet (last visited Mar.
9, 2007) (listing the actions of United Nations countries on a number of United
Nations documents).
605. CAT, supra note 97, at arts. 17-24.
606. Id. at art. 1.
607. Id. at art. 3.
608. 8 C.F.R. § 208.17 (2005).
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can demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he or she
will be tortured in the country to which he or she would be
returned, the United States will defer that person's
removal.609
Despite this added protection against torture, there may
be scenarios in which an applicant returned to the United
States under the STCA could successfully submit an
application to the CAT Committee. A person subjected to the
STCA could face a chain refoulement, from Canada to the
United States, and from the United States to another third
country that may eventually return him or her to the place
where torture will occur. Deferral of removal does not give an
applicant any right to remain in the United States; rather, it
only prohibits the return of a person to a particular
country. 610 Therefore, some applicants granted deferral of
removal may assert that the protection from torture provided
by the United States is inadequate. Chain refoulement
remains a possibility if Canada returns a refugee applicant to
the United States under the STCA. Another possible claim is
that the United States places too high a burden on an
applicant to receive the protection of deferral of removal. As
discussed above, applicants in the United States face a higher
burden of proof to receive the protection of deferral of removal
than they would to establish refugee status.61" ' The United
States uses the same burden of proof for deferral as it does for
withholding, a "more than likely than not" standard.6 2 Thus,
an applicant sent back to the United States under the STCA
could assert to the CAT Committee that this burden is
inconsistent with the CAT.
VIII. CONCLUSION
September 11, 2001, continues to cast a long shadow over
immigration on both sides of the U.S.-Canada border.
However, the STCA renders Canada complicit in a system
that does not satisfy its international obligations. The STCA
609. Id. Even if an asylum seeker is barred under criminal grounds or
terrorism grounds, the United States will not return that person. See id. Thus,
the United States' overly-broad exclusions, which put it at odds with
international standards, would not bar protection. See id.
610. Id.
611. See supra text accompanying note 65.
612. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).
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weakens refugee protection in North America by forcing more
refugee applicants to rely upon the U.S. refugee processing
system. Canada and the United States should engage in a
cross-border dialogue about refugee flows into North America
and how to closely calibrate their refugee processing systems.
More closely calibrating the refugee processing systems
between the two countries would require several things.
First, and most importantly, the United States must meet
minimum legal requirements. Second, Canada and the
United States need to address the reasons for the
disproportionate flow of applicants. This includes addressing
the disparity in recognition rates, reaching an agreement on
the treatment of gender-based claims, the provision of legal
representation, and basic support such as food and shelter.
This dialogue and agreement should not become a race to the
bottom so that both systems end up being equally
unwelcoming to refugee applicants.
There are incentives for both sides to pursue this
strategy. Currently, under the United States' harsh laws,
many who would have traveled to Canada to make a refugee
claim remain unlawfully in the United States or enter
Canada unlawfully.613 Canada's incentive to engage in a
more calibrated refugee processing system is the potential
reduction of the disproportionate flow northward. The United
States' incentive to do so is to bring those who remain outside
the system within the legal process, at the very least, for
security purposes. A calibrated system consistent with
international legal obligations will result in increased safety
for all.
613. Mackln, supra note 9, at 422-23.
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